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NEIGHBOR-ON-NEIGHBOR
HARASSMENT: DOES THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT MAKE A
FEDERAL CASE OUT OF IT?
Robert G. Schwemm†
I. INTRODUCTION
“This is a nice neighborhood—we don’t want people like you here.
Why don’t you go back to the ghetto where you belong.”1 Does the
federal Fair Housing Act2 (“FHA”) ban such statements to a minority
family who has just moved into a predominantly white neighborhood?
The FHA does contain an antiharassment provision (42 U.S.C.
§ 3617),3 and this certainly applies to firebombings and other types of
physical assault designed to drive the family out of the area.4 But does
§ 3617 also outlaw purely verbal attacks? And if so, how egregious
must the remarks be before a federal case should be made out of
them? For example, would substituting “Niggers” for “people like
you” in the above quote make a difference?
Today, more than forty years after the FHA’s enactment in 1968,5
housing harassment remains pervasive.6 Harassment and retaliation
† © 2011 Robert G. Schwemm. Robert G. Schwemm is the Ashland-Spears Professor at
the University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Florence Wagman Roisman, Sara Pratt,
Harry Carey, and Sarah Welling for their ideas and helpful comments on this Article.
1 These comments are a fictional amalgamation of actual remarks made to minorities in
various reported fair housing cases. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 298.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).
3 See infra text accompanying note 29 (setting out the full text of the provision).
4 See, e.g., infra notes 39, 72–76 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with
§ 3617 violations).
5
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89.
6 See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights,
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claims continue to account for a significant portion of all FHA
claims.7 According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”), the agency primarily responsible for
administering the FHA,8 well over a thousand § 3617 complaints
were filed with HUD and state and local fair housing agencies in each
of the past four years.9 A similar number of harassment claims are
made each year to private fair housing groups.10 In one particularly
egregious example of neighbor-on-neighbor harassment, a Latino
family in 2009 was awarded over $500,000 in damages against one of

84 IND. L.J. 963, 964 (2009) (“[I]n the past twenty years, minorities moving to all-White
neighborhoods in cities across the country have faced slurs, epithets, and other expressions of
racism directed at them by White neighbors who wish to drive them out of the community.”).
7 For modern case statistics involving FHA harassment claims, see infra notes 9–10. For
examples of housing harassment cases dating back to the earlier years of the FHA, see infra
notes 72 and 81.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006) (giving HUD the “authority and responsibility for
administering” the FHA).
9 Of the 10,242 FHA complaints filed with HUD and state and local fair housing
agencies in fiscal year (FY) 2009, 1425 (14%) alleged violations of § 3617, making this the
fourth largest category of claims of the thirteen categories reported, following only
discriminatory refusals to rent, discriminatory terms and conditions, and refusals to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled persons. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING FY 2009, at 26 (2010),
available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2009annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter 2009
REPORT]. Comparable figures for prior years were: 1402 (13%) in FY 2008, 1477 (15%) in FY
2007, 1354 (13%) in FY 2006, and 1192 (13%) in FY 2005. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING 6 (2009),
available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2008annual-rpt.pdf [hereinafter 2008
REPORT]. According to HUD, these complaint statistics represent “only a fraction of instances
of housing discrimination” that actually occur. Id. at 2.
HUD does not break down these § 3617 claims by type of discrimination (e.g., race or
sex), type of perpetrator (e.g., landlord or neighbor), or type of violation (e.g., harassment or
retaliation) alleged. As to the last subcategory, however, HUD does report how many retaliation
claims were made to state and local fair housing agencies and HUD in these years, with
retaliation accounting for 654 of these claims (6% of the total) in FY 2009, 575 (5%) in FY
2008, 588 (6%) in FY 2007, 577 (6%) in FY 2006, and 452 (5%) in FY 2005. See 2009 REPORT,
supra, at 22; 2008 REPORT, supra, at 3.
10 See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, A STEP IN THE R IGHT D IRECTION : 2010 F AIR
HOUSING T RENDS REPORT 24 (2010), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org
/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=APout1nxpwg%3d&tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,221
complaints of harassment were made to private fair housing groups in 2009 and that the primary
bases of these complaints were national origin (26% of the total), familial status (25%), race
(18%), sex (11%), and disability (10%)); see also NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, FAIR HOUSING
ENFORCEMENT: T IME FOR A C HANGE: 2009 FAIR HOUSING T RENDS REPORT 17 (2009),
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=dsT4nlHikhQ%3d&
tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,141 harassment complaints were made to private fair
housing groups in 2008); NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, DR. KING’S DEARM DENIED: FORTY
YEARS OF FAILED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT: 2008 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 50 (2008),
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qPHxLtjvaGA%3d&
tabid=3917&mid=5321 (reporting that 1,246 harassment complaints were made to private
groups in 2007).
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its white neighbors, although the legal basis for this case was state
law, not the FHA.11
Given how frequently housing harassment has occurred throughout
the FHA’s history, one might expect that the statute’s application to
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment would be settled by now. But a
series of court decisions over the past decade—particularly two
produced by the Seventh Circuit—has raised serious doubts about
how this matter should be handled.
The first of these came in 2004. Judge Posner’s opinion in Halprin
v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n,12 held that
homeowners subjected to anti-Jewish harassment by their neighbors
could not sue under the FHA’s main substantive provision (§ 3604); it
also suggested that § 3617 should be interpreted so as not to apply
either.13 Halprin’s theory was that the FHA’s protections are limited
to homeseekers and do not also cover current residents.14 But the
Seventh Circuit rejected this theory five years later in its en banc
opinion in Bloch v. Frischholz.15 Among other things, Bloch
“effectively overrule[d] Halprin as far as § 3617 is concerned.”16
While much of Halprin has now been swept aside,17 its hostility to
the idea of applying the FHA to most types of neighbor-on-neighbor
harassment lives on. Indeed, Bloch itself endorsed this part of the
Halprin opinion by announcing that the behavior condemned by
§ 3617 must be “more than a ‘quarrel among neighbors’ or an
‘isolated act of discrimination,’ but rather [must be] a ‘pattern of
11 See Rodriguiz v. Marrone, No. 09 L 3194 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2009), Fair Housing–Fair
Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.), Report Bulletin ¶ 10.2 (Oct. 1, 2009); see also Ky. Comm’n
on Human Rights v. Foster, No. 04-CI-03103 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008) (awarding a total of
$860,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and civil penalties against three defendants for
burning a cross, vandalizing property, and directing racial slurs against a black family). For
other neighbor harassment cases that produced large awards, see infra notes 94–95, 304. For a
recent example of a criminal prosecution in such a case, see United States v. Jackson, No. 3:10CR-00120-KLH (W.D. La. 2010). In Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to a FHA-related
crime for engaging in race-based intimidation; he placed a hangman’s noose in the carport of a
home next to his former employer. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Downsville, Louisiana,
Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Hate Crime (June 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/June/10-crt-742.html.
12 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
13 Id. at 330; see also infra notes 39–40, 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing this
holding in more detail).
14 388 F.3d at 329; see also infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (discussing this
theory in more detail).
15 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). For further discussion of Bloch, see infra notes
52–68 and accompanying text.
16 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782.
17 Much, but not all. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing what remains of
Halprin).
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harassment, invidiously motivated.’”18 Courts throughout the country
have expressed similar misgivings about applying the FHA to
neighbor harassment unless it involves systematic or highly abusive
behavior.19
But why should this be so? The text of § 3617 outlaws interference
“with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted
or protected by” the FHA’s substantive provisions.20 This means,
according to the governing interpretive regulation, that § 3617 bans
“interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling” because of
race or other FHA-prohibited factor.21 Certainly, hostile race-based
comments would seem likely to interfere with any reasonable
minority’s enjoyment of his or her home. Thus, if a neighbor verbally
harasses a homeowner or renter because of that person’s race,
national origin, religion, or other factor condemned by the FHA, it
would appear that this behavior is covered by § 3617.
Court opinions that have dismissed such behavior as merely a
neighbors’ quarrel not worthy of being made into a “federal case” are
essentially imposing some sort of de minimus defense on § 3617
cases, because they believe the FHA was not intended to impose a
“civility code” on neighbors.22 But the text of § 3617—surely the best
indicator of congressional intent—contains no such defense.23 Nor is
this provision analogous to the one in Title VII that the Supreme
Court has interpreted to prohibit only “severe or pervasive”
harassment in the employment context.24 Thus, the language of
§ 3617 might well be interpreted to extend to even isolated hostile
remarks, at least so long as that interpretation does not run afoul of
the speaker’s First Amendment rights.25 Furthermore, there are good
reasons to suppose that congressional concerns underlying the FHA

18
19
20

587 F.3d at 783 (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330).
See cases cited infra notes 69, 102, 109, 210 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of this provision, see infra text accompanying

note 29.
21 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). For the full text of this regulation, see infra text
accompanying note 156.
22 See, e.g., infra note 99 (discussing one district court’s reluctance to interpret § 3617 as
imposing a code of civility on neighbors).
23 See People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 3617
claim, and noting that “if the trier of fact considers that the acts of the [defendants] constituted
slight or de minimis interference, such a conclusion can be adequately reflected in an
appropriate award of damages”).
24 See infra note 215 (citing cases applying the “severe or pervasive” standard in Title VII
cases).
25 See infra Part III.E (discussing First Amendment considerations).
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might well be advanced by broadly interpreting § 3617 to outlaw all
forms of invidious harassment among neighbors.26
This Article analyzes the issue of whether § 3617 should be
interpreted to outlaw invidiously motivated disputes among
neighbors. Part II begins by examining § 3617’s text and its
relationship to the overall FHA. It then reviews § 3617 decisions in
neighbor harassment cases, including Halprin and Bloch. This
analysis shows that the scope of § 3617 is governed by the meaning
of “interfere with” and the relationship of § 3617 to the prohibitions it
references in §§ 3603–3606. These issues are further analyzed in Part
III, which examines § 3617’s legislative history and purpose, its
interpretation by HUD and courts in other types of § 3617 cases,
Supreme Court decisions in analogous Title VII cases, and the issue
of whether interpreting § 3617 to outlaw a neighbor’s verbal abuse
would pose First Amendment problems. The Article concludes that
applying § 3617 to neighbors’ quarrels (i.e., making a federal case out
of them) is appropriate in a much broader range of cases than
Halprin, Bloch, and many other decisions have allowed.
II. § 3617: TEXT, RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FHA PROVISIONS, AND
NEIGHBOR HARASSMENT CASE LAW
A. § 3617’s Text and Related Provisions
The modern FHA is primarily the product of two statutes: the
original law passed in 196827 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 198828 (“FHAA”). The current version of § 3617 was enacted by
the FHAA and provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or
on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account
of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the

For the relevant legislative history of § 3617, see infra Part III.B.
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89.
Pub. L. No. 100–430, 102 Stat. 1619. Other amendments not germane to this Article
have been made to the original 1968 FHA. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 11C:1, 11E:8 (2010) (describing, respectively, FHA
amendments adding “sex” to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination and changing the
requirements for the “55 or over” housing-for-older-persons exemption to the prohibitions
against familial status discrimination). For more on the 1988 FHAA, see infra notes 85–93 and
accompanying text.
26
27
28
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exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.29
This language is identical in its substantive prohibitions to the version
of this provision that was enacted in the original 1968 FHA.30 The
only change made by the 1988 amendments was procedural: the
FHAA made violations of § 3617 subject to the statute’s regular
enforcement methods, which had previously controlled only claims
under the FHA’s other substantive provisions.31
The text of § 3617 shows that three elements are required for its
violation: (1) the defendant must “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with” some person (2) “in the exercise or enjoyment of, or
on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of” (3) a “right granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606. As
for the first element, the meaning of the four verbs—particularly
“interfere with”—is crucial in determining how far § 3617 goes in
outlawing neighbor-on-neighbor harassment. The second element has
three alternative parts, one of which—“having aided or encouraged”
another—has produced a good deal of § 3617 litigation,32 but is not
generally relevant to the problem of the harassment of minorities,
29

42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
See Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 817, 82 Stat. at 89; infra notes 122, 128 and
accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the proposed language for § 3617).
31 This change was accomplished by broadening the FHA’s definition of “discriminatory
housing practice” to include acts made unlawful by § 3617 and by deleting the second sentence
in § 3617 (“This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.”). The 1988 FHAA
defines “discriminatory housing practice” to mean “an act that is unlawful under section 3604,
3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006). The 1968 FHA defined the term
to mean “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(f) (1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100–711, at 21 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2182 (“Section 5(a) [of the 1988 FHAA] broadens the definition of
discriminatory housing practice to include prohibitions against coercion, intimidation, threats or
interference under Section 817 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3617].”).
An act that constitutes a “discriminatory housing practice” triggers the statute’s two
private enforcement methods. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (authorizing complaints
to HUD by persons aggrieved by “an alleged discriminatory housing practice”); id.
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) (authorizing civil actions by persons aggrieved by “an alleged discriminatory
housing practice”). This “discriminatory housing practice” phrase is not used in the provision
that authorizes the FHA’s third enforcement method (civil actions by the Attorney General in
“pattern or practice” and “general public importance” cases), id. § 3614(a), which is triggered
by resistance to or denial of “any of the rights granted by” the FHA. This language is similar to
that used in the 1968 FHA and has always authorized § 3617-based claims by the Attorney
General. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:1 n.9 (discussing § 3617 claims brought by the
Attorney General pursuant to this enforcement method).
For examples of § 3617 cases brought under the original second sentence of this provision
in the 1968–1988 period, see infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 178, 182, and 185.
30
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whose § 3617 claims turn on whether the behavior directed against
them is in response to “the exercise or enjoyment of” their own FHA
rights. Finally, a person asserting a claim under § 3617 must be, or
must have been, exercising or enjoying a “right granted or protected
by” §§ 3603–3606.
The FHA provisions referred to in § 3617, i.e., §§ 3603–3606,
contain the substantive heart of the statute. The most important of
these provisions is § 3604, whose subsections (a) and (b) make it
unlawful, respectively, to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin”33 and to “discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”34 The rest
of §§ 3603–3606 outlaws various other specified discriminatory
housing practices.35
One other provision worth mentioning here is § 3631, which was
passed along with the 1968 FHA as a separate title and which
provides for criminal sanctions for anyone who “willfully injuries
[sic], intimidates or interferes with” another’s fair housing rights “by
force or threat of force.”36 Although technically not a part of the FHA,
§ 3631’s prohibitions concerning interference with fair housing rights
parallel those of § 3617, and the same behavior may produce both a
criminal charge under § 3631 and a civil claim under § 3617.37
B. § 3617 Case Law Involving Neighbor-on-Neighbor
Harassment
This Section surveys neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases
under § 3617 in two subsections. The first describes the Halprin and
33 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). A nearly identical prohibition dealing with handicap
discrimination is contained in § 3604(f)(1).
34 Id. § 3604(b). A nearly identical prohibition dealing with handicap discrimination is
contained in § 3604(f)(2).
35 Section 3603 provides for effective dates and certain exemptions. Section 3604’s
remaining subsections deal, respectively, with discriminatory ads, notices, and statements;
misrepresentations of availability; “blockbusting”; and handicap discrimination. Id. § 3604(c)–
(f). Section 3605 outlaws discriminatory home financing and other residential real estate–related
transactions. Section 3606 bans discrimination in brokerage organizations and related services.
36 Id. § 3631 (originally passed as Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
37 See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving § 3631
prosecutions).

Commented [JM1]: This misspelling is unfortunately in §3631.
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Bloch cases mentioned in the Introduction;38 the second deals with
pre-Halprin cases, which are presented roughly in chronological
order. The general conclusion of this Section is that § 3617’s
applicability to neighbor-on-neighbor harassment raises issues with
respect to all three of the elements of a § 3617 claim identified in the
previous Section (i.e., Did the defendant’s behavior (1) “interfere
with” (2) the plaintiff’s “exercise or enjoyment of” (3) a “right”
recognized by §§ 3603–3606?).
1. Halprin and Bloch
The plaintiffs in both Halprin and Bloch alleged that the
defendants’ conduct violated both § 3617 and one or more of the
substantive provisions referred to in § 3617. In Halprin, the plaintiffs
were a couple who owned a home in a Chicago suburb; they claimed
that they were subjected to anti-Jewish epithets and other harassment
by neighbors and the local homeowners’ association in violation of
§§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617.39 The Seventh Circuit held that, as
homeowners, they could not pursue claims under § 3604(a) or
§ 3604(b) because those provisions dealt only with activities “that
prevent people from acquiring property”—not with the mistreatment
of the purchasers or renters after acquisition.40 According to Judge
Posner, in enacting § 3604 Congress was concerned only with “access
to housing” and not harassment that might result from “unwanted
associations” after property is acquired; if Congress had addressed
postacquisition problems, that endeavor “would have required careful
drafting in order to make sure that quarrels between neighbors did not
become a routine basis for federal litigation.”41
Halprin dealt with the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim somewhat
differently. Judge Posner ruled that this claim could proceed,42 but
only because a HUD regulation interpreting § 3617 purported to
extend it to postacquisition situations,43 and the defendants had not
38

See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328
(7th Cir. 2004).
40 Id. at 328–29 (emphasis added). Judge Posner did recognize that if hostile neighbors
went so far as to burn down a minority’s house, such behavior might be covered by § 3604(a)’s
make “unavailable” phrase or § 3604(b)’s language barring discriminatory “privileges of sale or
rental.” Id. at 329. Short of such an extreme example amounting to “constructive eviction,”
however, Halprin held that § 3604 does not apply to discrimination encountered by current
residents of a dwelling. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 330–31.
43 The relevant HUD regulation forbids “interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a
dwelling because of . . . [such persons’] religion.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010). Halprin
39
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challenged the validity of this regulation.44 Still, the Halprin opinion
strongly suggested that this regulation improperly extended the FHA
“contrary to the language of section 3617,” and that § 3617, properly
interpreted, would no more apply to postacquisition problems than
§ 3604. This is because § 3617 “provides legal protection only against
acts that interfere with one or more of the other sections of the Act
that are referred to in section 3617.”45 In support of this view, Judge
Posner reiterated that, whether under § 3617 or any other provision of
the FHA, “we do not want, and we do not think Congress wanted, to
convert every quarrel among neighbors in which a racial or religious
slur is hurled into a federal case.”46
Halprin’s theory that the FHA’s protections do not extend to
current residents was controversial and marked a radical departure
from prior case law.47 Some courts went along, notably the Fifth
Circuit,48 but many did not.49 HUD and the Justice Department

conceded that the “enjoyment of a dwelling” in this regulation “can take place after the dwelling
has been acquired.” 388 F.3d at 330.
44 Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
45 Id.
46 Id. The Halprin opinion recognized that in this case, the plaintiffs had alleged “a
pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated, and . . . backed by the homeowners’ association,”
which meant that it was “a matter of the neighbors’ ganging up on them” and thus it was “far
from a simple quarrel between two neighbors or [an] isolated act of harassment.” Id.
47 Prior to Halprin, courts regularly recognized FHA claims by current residents. See, e.g.,
SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 14:3 nn.1–3, 5, 29–31, 36–37 (collecting cases in which courts
recognized FHA claims by current residents); see also Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329 (noting five
such cases, but opining that none of them “contains a considered holding on the scope of the
Fair Housing Act in general or its application to a case like the present one in particular”).
Commentators were generally critical of the Halprin theory. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is
Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Halprin and its progeny were wrongly decided . . . .”);
Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the Fair
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 729–30 (2008) (identifying six failures in the Halprin
opinion); Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58
ALA. L. REV. 203, 206 (2006) (noting that the court’s reasoning in Halprin, “if applied in future
cases, would result in a significantly restricted ambit for the FHA, one limited only to claims of
discrimination occurring during a real estate transaction”).
48 See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 740–47 (5th Cir. 2005) (adopting the Halprin
theory that the FHA’s protections do not extend to current residents). District court decisions
endorsing the Halprin theory include Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D. Fla. 2004), and Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n of
Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235–36 (M.D. Fla. 2003), vacated pursuant to
settlement, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003). For
descriptions of Lawrence and Gourlay, see infra note 213.
49 See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690,
711–15 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the FHA reaches postacquisition discrimination); United
States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972–80 (D. Neb. 2004) (rejecting the argument that
postacquisition claims cannot be maintained under the FHA); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 14:3
n.20 (citing cases that reject Halprin). For a description of the Koch case, see infra note 262.
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continued to support § 3604 claims brought by current residents50 and
to defend HUD’s regulation providing for § 3617’s application to
postacquisition situations.51
Eventually, as noted above, the en banc Seventh Circuit rejected
the Halprin theory in the Bloch case.52 Bloch also involved Jewish
homeowners; the plaintiffs complained that officers of their
condominium association (i.e., some of their neighbors) adopted rules
that led to removal of the plaintiffs’ mezuzot from the doorposts
outside their units in violation of §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617.53
The Blochs also sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and various
state law theories.54 The district court, relying on Halprin, granted
50 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, George v. Colony Lakes Prop. Owners
Ass’n, No. 1:05-cv-05899, 2006 WL 1735345 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006), 2006 WL 1437953, at
*6 n.3 (stating the Justice Department’s belief “that Section 3604 applies to post-acquisition
discrimination” and disagreeing with Halprin’s contrary conclusion); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Charges Virginia Beach Landlord with Violating the Fair
Housing Act (May 17, 2007), available at http://archives.hud.gov/news/2007/pr07-067.cfm
(describing HUD’s charge against an apartment owner for violating the FHA by, inter alia,
“subjecting African-American tenants to stricter rules than others”).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying
the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion in case prosecuted by the Justice Department and stating that
until the court of appeals invalidates the regulation, the district court will apply the regulation as
written); Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 978–79 (rejecting Halprin in case prosecuted by the Justice
Department and holding that “the plain language of section 3617 should be read to prohibit
unlawful discriminatory conduct after a person has taken possession of a dwelling”).
52 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
53 Id. at 772–75.
54 Id. at 774–75. The relevant portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees U.S.
citizens “the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). The defendants did not
dispute “the legal underpinnings of the § 1982 theory” but “only whether there [were] sufficient
facts to support it.” 587 F.3d at 775 n.5. Based on its determination that the facts were sufficient
to show intentional discrimination, the Seventh Circuit allowed the Blochs to proceed on their
§ 1982 claim, along with their FHA claims under § 3604(b) and § 3617 and their state-law
claims. Id. at 787.
Section 1982 has provided an independent basis for housing-discrimination claims ever
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Sometimes § 1982 and the FHA overlap, as in Bloch, and sometimes § 1982 alone provides
coverage when gaps in the FHA preclude it from applying. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28,
§ 27:2 (discussing the independence of § 1982 and the FHA); see also CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (noting Congress’s longstanding general intent to
provide overlapping remedies against discrimination). Courts have not yet considered the degree
to which § 1982 outlaws neighbor-on-neighbor harassment independent of the FHA, but it is
clear, based on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), that § 1982 does
provide a cause of action for persons who are injured by a defendant’s interference with § 1982
rights. See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1955 (describing Sullivan’s holding); Gomez–Perez v.
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2008) (same). Indeed, given § 1982’s language explicitly
guaranteeing a right to “hold” property equal to that “enjoyed” by whites, § 1982’s coverage of
neighbor harassment is arguably even more clear than § 3617’s. See, e.g., Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) (holding that vandalizing a synagogue is
actionable under § 1982). In any event, it is at least possible that, to the extent the FHA is
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summary judgment for the defendants, and a divided panel of the
Seventh Circuit affirmed,55 but the en banc court took a decidedly
different approach in a unanimous opinion.56 It held that some
postacquisition situations are indeed covered by § 3604(a) and (b).57
The en banc decision also upheld the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim,58
endorsing HUD’s view that § 3617 covers postacquisition harassment
and determining that HUD’s § 3617 regulation should be given “great
weight” in interpreting this provision.59 This part of the Bloch opinion
began by noting that a § 3617 violation could occur even without a
violation of § 3604.60 Thus:

interpreted not to apply in such a case, a plaintiff might still be able to prevail under § 1982.
55 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 775.
56 In an amazing reversal of views, Judge Posner and three other Seventh Circuit judges
who had previously endorsed Halprin’s narrow reading of the FHA changed their minds and
joined the en banc opinion in Bloch. The eight judges who joined the Bloch en banc opinion
included two who had joined the Halprin opinion (Posner and Kanne), and two others who had
followed Halprin in ruling against the plaintiffs in the Bloch panel decision (Easterbrook and
Bauer). Id. at 772. Judge Williams, who had also joined the Halprin opinion, took no part in the
consideration of the Bloch case. Id. at 772 n.*.
57 See id. at 776–79 (describing how postacquisition harassment may make housing
“unavailable” under § 3604(a)); id. at 779–81 (describing two situations in which
postacquisition claims would be possible under § 3604(b) and, in particular, discussing how
§ 3604(b)’s “privileges” might be involved in such cases).
58 Id. at 781–83.
59 Id. at 782 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Decisions between Halprin and Bloch generally agreed that
this regulation is valid. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park
Ass’n, No. 01 C 4673, 2006 WL 2506223, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2006); George v. Colony
Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, No. 05 C 5899, 2006 WL 1735345, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006);
King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142–45 (D. Kan. 2005); United
States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Richards v. Bono, No.
5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005); United States v.
Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–80 (D. Neb. 2004). But see Jones v. South Bend Hous. Auth.,
No. 3:08-CV-596, 2009 WL 1657466, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2009) (holding this
regulation invalid); Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-053197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (same), aff’d, 235 Fed. App’x 227
(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
For its part, after Halprin, the Seventh Circuit twice avoided ruling on the regulation’s
validity by finding that the defendant, as in Halprin, waived this issue and then ruling against
the plaintiff-resident’s § 3617 claim on the merits. See Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners
Ass’n, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2006); East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway
Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 562 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). For further discussion of Walton, see infra notes
70–71.
60 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 781. Until Bloch, the Seventh Circuit had reserved this question, see
id., but numerous other courts had held that a § 3617 violation does not require a violation of
some other FHA provision. See cases cited infra notes 182, 191. As the Bloch opinion put it:
To hold otherwise would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the other FHA
provisions; though its language is unique in the FHA, § 3617 would have no
independent meaning. But “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of
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Coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with or on
account of a person’s exercise of his or her §§ 3603–3606
rights can be distinct from outright violations of §§ 3603–
3606. For instance, if a landlord rents to a white tenant but
then threatens to evict him upon learning that he is married to
a black woman, the landlord has plainly violated § 3617,
whether he actually evicts the tenant or not.61
As Bloch put it, because “§ 3604 prohibits discriminatory evictions, it
follows that attempted discriminatory evictions can violate § 3617’s
prohibition against interference with § 3604 rights.”62 Thus, a § 3617
claim based on interference “with or on account of plaintiff’s § 3604
rights does not require that the plaintiff actually vacate the
premises.”63 As a result, § 3617 “reaches a broader range of postacquisition conduct” than § 3604.64 These rulings meant that the
plaintiffs in Bloch could prevail under § 3617 if they showed that the
defendants interfered with the “exercise or enjoyment of their right to
inhabit their condo units because of their race or religion.”65 The

the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings
were intended.”
587 F.3d at 781–82 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004)).
61 587 F.3d at 782.
62 Id. An actual discriminatory eviction would presumably violate both § 3604 and
§ 3617, but the applicability of two FHA provisions to this one situation did not trouble the
Bloch court, which noted, “That §§ 3604 and 3617 might overlap in some circumstances is
‘neither unusual nor unfortunate.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778
(1979)).
63 Id.
64 Id. Bloch itself provided an example of this, as the en banc opinion held that the
defendants’ conduct might well violate the plaintiffs’ rights under § 3617, but that it did not
violate their § 3604(a) rights because it had not caused their constructive eviction. Id. at 777–79.
65 Id. at 783. According to the en banc opinion, a plaintiff in the Blochs’ position must
show four things to prevail on a § 3617 claim, i.e., that:
(1) she is a protected individual under the FHA, (2) she was engaged in the exercise
or enjoyment of her fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, threatened,
intimidated, or interfered with the plaintiff on account of her protected activity under
the FHA, and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate.
Id. (citing East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005)). For
similar descriptions of the elements required for this type of § 3617 claim, see Walton v.
Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n, 191 Fed. App’x 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2006); People Helpers
Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1992); HUD v. Krueger,
Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,119, at 26,026 (HUD ALJ 1996),
available at 1996 WL 418886, aff’d sub nom. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir.
1997); HUD v. Kogut, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,100, at 25,895,
25,904 (HUD ALJ 1995), available at 1995 WL 225277; HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair
Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, ¶ 25,726 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL
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Bloch opinion recognized that “this interpretation effectively
overrules Halprin as far as § 3617 is concerned.”66 But one aspect of
Halprin remained—its determination that mere “quarrels among
neighbors,” even if invidiously motivated, should not give rise to a
FHA claim.67 The Bloch opinion endorsed this view and thus
concluded that only a “pattern of harassment” could violate § 3617.68
This was the one part of Halprin that apparently was not
controversial. Indeed, even before Halprin was decided in 2004, a
number of other courts had expressed similar views in § 3617
cases69—albeit generally in dicta, as in Halprin and Bloch70—and no
case took the contrary position in the five years between Halprin and
the en banc decision in Bloch.71
2. § 3617 Case Law Before Halprin
By the time Halprin was decided in 2004, about thirty cases had
been reported that involved § 3617 harassment claims brought by
protected-class homeowners and renters. One of the earliest was
Stackhouse v. DeSitter,72 in which a new black resident of a white

441981, modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ
1994). For more on the fourth element set forth in Bloch and these other cases, see infra notes
272–73 and accompanying text.
66 587 F.3d at 782.
67 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327,
329–30 (7th Cir. 2004).
68 587 F.3d at 783 (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 See, e.g., Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp.
2d 1222, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (determining that the FHA should not be interpreted as “an all
purpose cause of action for neighbors of different races, origins, faiths, or with different types or
concepts of families to bring neighborhood feuds into federal court when the dispute has little or
no actual relation to housing discrimination”), vacated pursuant to settlement, 2003 WL
22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003); infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing
two more district court cases); infra note 210 (quoting an additional district court case).
70 These views were only dicta in Halprin and Bloch because the courts there found that
such a pattern was alleged, Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783; Halprin, 338 F.3d at 330, as was true in
many of the other opinions that have endorsed this view. For exceptions, see cases quoted infra
note 71; infra note 103 and accompanying text.
71 Only a handful of neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases were reported between
Halprin and Bloch. See district court cases cited supra note 48. The Seventh Circuit itself
decided one in an unreported decision that rejected such a § 3617 claim asserted by a black
renter acting pro se. See Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x 446
(7th Cir. 2006). Walton held, based on Halprin’s view that “there is a difference between a
pattern of and an isolated act of harassment,” id. at 451 (citing Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330), that a
white neighbor’s remark that “there is more than one way to lynch a nigger,” id. (internal
quotation marks omitted), was merely “a single act of harassment that could not create a hostile
housing environment,” id. at 452 (citing DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir.
1996)), and thus could not sustain an interference claim under § 3617.
72 566 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1983), reconsideration granted in part, 620 F. Supp. 208
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Chicago suburb alleged that a neighbor firebombed his car to
intimidate the plaintiff and his family and drive them out of the area.73
The defendant was convicted of arson in a separate state court
proceeding.74 With respect to the plaintiff’s civil action, Judge Aspen
initially questioned § 3617’s applicability,75 but then held two years
later that the defendant’s behavior was “squarely within the range of
actions prohibited by § 3617.”76
Claims like the one in Stackhouse, brought by minority families
who are harassed because they were about to move or had moved into
predominantly white areas, presumably come within the language of
§ 3617 that protects a “person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of his having exercised or enjoyed” FHA rights.77 In a
number of early cases involving this scenario, the harassment was so
violent that the Justice Department prosecuted the offenders in
criminal actions based on § 3631,78 which was passed in 1968 as a
companion title to the FHA.79 Victims of such behavior are
presumably entitled to bring civil claims under § 3617,80 but only a
handful actually did so in the first two decades of the FHA.81

(N.D. Ill. 1985).
73 Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 209, 211.
74 Id. at 211.
75 Stackhouse, 566 F. Supp. at 859.
76 Stackhouse, 620 F. Supp. at 211.
77 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of this section, see supra text accompanying
note 28.
78 See, e.g., United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the
defendant’s conviction for conspiring with others to burn down a black family’s home); United
States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the defendants’ convictions for
throwing rocks at and firebombing a black family’s home); United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d
317 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing the defendants’ convictions for acts of vandalism and arson
directed against a black family because the defendants had been indicted by the same grand jury
that heard their immunized testimony), aff’d on reh’g, 560 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1977). In addition,
some § 3631 prosecutions were brought against defendants who targeted white homeowners for
physical violence and threats because they had brought black friends into their homes. E.g.,
United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving defendants who targeted an interracial couple).
79 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1062–64 (W.D. Mo. 2000)
(granting summary judgment in favor of § 3617 claim brought on behalf of minority family
whose home was the target of the defendants’ cross burning, which had already resulted in
criminal convictions under § 3631); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that targets of the defendant’s behavior had, before the defendant’s § 3631
conviction, filed civil suit under state fair housing law that “resulted in a judgment and a
substantial monetary award in favor of the plaintiffs”).
81 See, e.g., Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 121, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the
plaintiff’s allegation that firebombing of her home deprived her of the right to enjoy and hold
property on an equal basis with white citizens was sufficient to support a § 3617 claim);
Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 138–39 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s
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Also beginning in the 1980s, some courts held sexual harassment
claims actionable under § 3617.82 There are, however, two
noteworthy distinctions between the sex-based and race-based
harassment claims brought during this period. First, the race-based
cases often involved only a § 3617 claim, whereas all of the sex
harassment decisions found liability under § 3604(b) or some other
FHA provision as well as under § 3617. Indeed, many held that the
standards for judging a defendant’s conduct were the same under
§ 3617 as under the FHA’s other provisions (i.e., the § 3617 claim
was not independently valuable to the plaintiff).83 Second, although
some of the defendants in the sex harassment cases lived near the
plaintiffs, they were generally sued in their role as landlords or other
housing providers, not neighbors.84
allegation that the defendants attempted to force the plaintiff from his home might support a
claim under § 3617); Waheed v. Kalafut, No. 86 C 6674, 1988 WL 9092, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2,
1988) (holding that the allegation that the defendant attempted to oust a black family from their
home was sufficient to support a § 3617 claim). Virtually all of these early § 3617 harassment
cases arose, like Stackhouse, in the Chicago area. See Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp.,
996 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that most prior cases recognizing such a § 3617
claim have “come from the Northern District of Illinois”).
82 See, e.g., Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835, 840–41 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the
plaintiff, who refused the defendant’s sexual demands, was intimidated, threatened, or interfered
with by him as required for a § 3617 claim); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp.
1101, 1103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the plaintiffs can succeed under § 3617 if they can
demonstrate severe and pervasive sexual harassment as well as a relationship between that
harassment and housing). For more modern sex harassment cases brought under § 3617, see
infra notes 113, 301–06 and accompanying text.
83 See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 nn.36–37 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., Greiger, 689 F. Supp. at 836 (defendant sued in role as landlord); see also
cases cited infra note 113.
In some cases, harassment by other neighbors was alleged, but the issue was whether the
defendant-landlord should be held liable for this harassment, not whether these other neighbors
were liable. The courts are divided as to whether a landlord or other housing provider may be
held liable for tolerating neighbor-on-neighbor harassment. Compare Neudecker v. Boisclair
Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364–65 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Yes” in § 3617 case), Scialabba v. Sierra Blanca
Condo. No. One Ass’n, No. 00 C 5344, 2000 WL 1889664, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2000)
(“Yes” in case alleging a “violation of § 3604(f)(1), in conjunction with § 3617”), Wilstein v.
San Tropai Condo. Master Ass’n, No. 98 C 6211, 1999 WL 262145, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22,
1999) (“Yes” under the FHA), Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, Fair
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 16,250, at 16,250.6–.7 (D.D.C. 1997),
available at 1997 WL 1877201 (“Yes” under the FHA and §§ 1981–1982), and Bradley v.
Carydale Ents., 707 F. Supp. 217, 223–25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“Yes” in case brought under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 and state and local fair housing laws), with Haynes v. Wilder Corp. of
Del., 721 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“Neither the FHA nor the ADA requires a
landlord to intervene in a purely private dispute among tenants.”); Lawrence v. Courtyards at
Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“No” in FHA case),
and Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 892 N.E.2d 415, 417–20 (Ohio
2008) (“No” under Ohio fair housing law). The issue of this type of vicarious liability comes up
in other situations as well. See, e.g., Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (declining to hold husband liable for wife’s racially motivated harassment of an Indian
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In the 1990s and early 2000s before Halprin, many more cases
involving § 3617 claims of race- or sex-based harassment were
reported. Before dealing with these cases, it is important to describe
the ways in which the FHAA impacted them. As noted above, the
FHAA made § 3617 claims subject to the FHA’s regular enforcement
methods.85 It left intact § 3631 (the criminal-interference statute) as
well as most of the other substantive prohibitions to which § 3617
refers (i.e., §§ 3603–3606). It did, however, add “familial status” and
“handicap” to the bases of discrimination forbidden by these
provisions.86 Additionally, in response to Congress’s perception that
continuing high levels of housing discrimination had resulted in part
from the inadequate enforcement system of the 1968 FHA,87 the
FHAA strengthened both the private and governmental enforcement
mechanisms of the FHA.88 The FHAA’s new enforcement system
provided, inter alia, that private complaints, including those now
based on § 3617, could be filed with HUD and could ultimately result
in charges that were prosecuted by government lawyers either before
HUD administrative law judges or in federal court.89 Finally, the
FHAA directed HUD to promptly issue rules interpreting the new

family under agency theory in FHA case); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 n. 58 (citing FHA
cases dealing with housing provider’s vicarious liability for employee’s harassment of the
plaintiff); cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–92, 807–08 (1998) (describing
the circumstances under which an employer is liable for harassment by its employees under
Title VII); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760–65 (1998) (same).
85 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
86 SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:3. The only other major substantive change dealt with
expanding § 3605’s prohibition of mortgage discrimination and other residential real estate–
related transactions. See id. § 18:1 nn.5–14 and accompanying text.
87 One of the FHAA’s key goals was to provide the 1968 FHA with “an effective
enforcement system” in order to make the FHA’s promise of nondiscrimination “a reality,”
because the 1988 Congress saw the original FHA as having been “ineffective because it lack[ed]
an effective enforcement mechanism.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 13, 15–16 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2174, 2176–77.
88 The FHAA strengthened all three of the FHA’s enforcement techniques by
(1) establishing an expedited administrative complaint procedure that could result in injunctive
relief, damages, and civil penalties; (2) eliminating the punitive damage cap, lengthening the
statute of limitations, and making attorney’s fees awards easier to obtain in private litigation;
and (3) authorizing the Justice Department to collect monetary damages for aggrieved persons
in its “pattern or practice” and “general public importance” cases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–3614
(2006); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:3 nn.6–9 and accompanying text; id. § 24:1–:2. See
generally id. ch. 24–26 (discussing the FHA’s three enforcement methods).
89 See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, ch. 24 (discussing complaints to HUD). Private
complainants could also bypass this system and file suit directly in court, as was also true under
the 1968 FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (describing enforcement of FHA in civil action by
private persons); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 24:1 n.11 and accompanying text (discussing
same).
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FHA.90 HUD complied in early 1989, and the resulting regulations
included one on the meaning of § 3617.91 As noted above, HUD’s
§ 3617 regulation played a key role in both Halprin and Bloch,92 and
it was also available for guidance—indeed, was required to be given
Chevron deference93—in all other § 3617 cases after 1989.
Most of the reported § 3617 decisions involving minority
harassment between 1989 and Halprin favored the claimants. Five of
these were HUD administrative decisions that found § 3617 violations
after an evidentiary hearing.94 The behavior in three of these cases
involved only verbal attacks on the complainants; two of the three
involved a series of such attacks,95 but in the third, liability was based
only on a single conversation.96
Court decisions during this period generally took the form of
pretrial rulings that focused on whether the plaintiffs’ complaint was
sufficient to state a claim under § 3617, rather than trial-based
90 42 U.S.C. § 3601, note on Initial Rulemaking. Prior to the FHAA, HUD had issued a
few FHA regulations pursuant to a provision in the 1968 FHA giving HUD the “authority and
responsibility for administering” the FHA. Id. § 3608(a). The FHAA made explicit HUD’s
authority to issue such regulations and indeed mandated that HUD do this within 180 days of
the FHAA’s passage. Id. § 3601, note on Initial Rulemaking.
91 24 C.F.R. § 100.400 (2010). For the text of this regulation, see infra note 156 and
accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 60 and
accompanying text (discussing Bloch).
93 For a discussion of Chevron deference, see infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
94 See HUD v. Simpson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,082,
at 25,760 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 497538 (holding that the respondentneighbors’ two-year campaign of harassment against Hispanic family that included numerous
incidents of physical conduct and verbal abuse interfered with the family “in the enjoyment of a
dwelling” in violation of § 3617 and awarding $180,000 in emotional distress damages to three
members of the family plus other monetary relief and $20,000 in civil penalties); HUD v.
Lashley, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,039 (HUD ALJ 1992),
available at 1992 WL 406539 (awarding maximum civil penalty and $67,000 in damages
against two respondent-neighbors for violating § 3617 by verbally abusing a minority family
and attempting to firebomb their home); cases cited infra notes 95–96.
95 HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078,
¶¶ 25,726–28 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (determining that the
responsent-neighbor interfered with black tenants in violation of § 3617 by a series of remarks
that included racial epithets directed at the complainants’ children and efforts to convince their
landlord to evict complainants), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.)
¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994); HUD v. Johnson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. &
Bus.) ¶ 25,076 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 391135 (awarding maximum civil
penalty and $300,000 in emotional distress damages for the responsent-neighbor’s violation of
§ 3617 based on lengthy campaign of verbal abuse and threats directed against a minority tenant
and his white friend).
96 HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041, ¶ 25,424
(HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 42262 (finding a § 3617 violation where the
respondent-neighbor made threats and otherwise “verbally assaulted” the Hmong complainant
while the latter was inspecting next-door house as a prospective tenant). For further discussion
of the Weber case, see infra note 276.
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rulings.97 The allegations in virtually all of these cases set forth a
series of verbal and sometimes even physical attacks by the
defendants, with the courts generally holding that such behavior, if
proved, would violate the minority plaintiffs’ rights under § 3617.98
In some cases, however, district courts expressed skepticism about
applying § 3617 to a neighbors’ dispute even when a lengthy pattern
of harassment was alleged.99 One of these was Egan v. Schmock,100 a
97 One case that did go to trial during this period was United States ex rel. Smith v. Hobbs,
44 F. Supp. 2d 788, 789–90 (S.D.W.Va. 1999), where, after a jury verdict for the black
plaintiffs, the court—albeit without mentioning § 3617—granted a permanent injunction barring
the defendant-neighbors from continuing to “interfere” with the plaintiffs’ FHA rights in a case
in which the defendants repeatedly hurled egregious racial epithets and threats of physical
violence while brandishing weapons.
98 See, e.g., United States v. Altmayer, 368 F. Supp. 2d 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying
the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the government’s § 3617 claim, which was based on
an alleged “extended pattern of harassment” against the intervenor-plaintiffs, because the
harrassment was “backed by the homeowners’ association to which the plaintiffs belong,
[making it] a matter of the neighbors’ ganging up on them”); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place
Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239–43 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying the defendant-neighbors’
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim, which alleged “a series of
discriminatory acts . . . [that] took the form of racial and anti-Jewish slurs and epithets, threats
of bodily harm, and noise disturbances”); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 62–65 (N.D.
Ohio 1996) (granting the black plaintiffs summary judgment on liability on their §§ 3617,
3604(a), and 1982 claims based on the defendant-neighbor’s tossing a Molotov cocktail onto
porch of the plaintiffs’ home); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 236–39 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(denying defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim, which
alleged that the defendants burned a cross in the plaintiffs’ yard and broke a window in their
home because three of the children in the home were mixed race); see also Johns v. Stillwell,
No. 3:07cv00063, 2008 WL 2795884, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 18, 2008) (denying the defendantlandlord’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 3604(a)–(c) and 3617,
which alleged that the defendant and the plaintiffs’ neighbors engaged “in a pattern of racial
harassment and intimidation” over a six-year period that included verbal abuse and destruction
of property (the court dealt exclusively with the § 3604(c) claim becaue the defendant’s motion
to dismiss did not challenge the other claims)); Bryant v. Polston, No. IP 00-1064-C-T/G, 2000
WL 1670938, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the white plaintiffs’ claim under § 3617, which alleged that the defendants
subjected them to “a continuous pattern of racially derogatory remarks, acts of intimidation and
gestures of violence or bodily harm with a gun” because the plaintiffs entertained blacks in their
home); see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1133–36
(E.D. Va. 1992) (denying the defendant-neighbors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
§ 3617 claim, which accused the defendants of making numerous derogatory and threatening
remarks and otherwise working to stop the plaintiff-organization from operating a group home
for disabled minorities in the defendants’ neighborhood).
For further discussion of the Ohana decision, see infra notes 260–64 and accompanying
text.
99 In addition to the Egan and Weisz opinions discussed in the text, see infra text
accompanying notes 100–08, such skeptical comments also appeared in Sporn v. Ocean Colony
Condominium Ass’n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.N.J. 2001), a case involving several FHA
claims based on handicap and familial-status discrimination. The § 3617 claim in Sporn was
based on allegations that, in retaliation for the plaintiffs’ having filed a HUD complaint accusing
their condominium officials of discriminating against families with children, those officials and
other neighbors responded by “shunning” the plaintiffs. Id. Because this claim was based on the
defendants’ response to the plaintiffs’ FHA complaint rather than to their status as families with
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2000 case that dismissed a § 3617 claim by a California minority
family who alleged that the defendant-neighbors had engaged in
numerous acts of physical harassment and verbal abuse against the
plaintiffs over a nine-year period.101 The Egan court rejected the
theory that “any discriminatory conduct which interferes with an
individual’s enjoyment of his or her home” violates § 3617, because
this would mean that “any dispute between neighbors of different
races or religions could result in a lawsuit in federal court under the
FHA.”102 Instead, the court held that only those acts that are
“designed to drive the victim out of his or her home” should be
actionable.103
Another district court dismissal of a § 3617 claim based on a
neighbors’ dispute occurred in 1996 in a case from the New York
City area, United States v. Weisz.104 The Justice Department brought
this case on behalf of a Catholic family (the Cronins), who claimed
that a Jewish neighbor (Pearl Weisz) harassed them over an eighteenmonth period “because of the Cronins’ religion.”105 The Weisz court
discounted the religious nature of this dispute, concluding that the
defendant’s behavior was prompted by the Cronins’ conduct, not their
religion.106 The court conceded that some of the alleged incidents

children or disabled persons, it is not like the cases discussed in this section. (For a further
discussion of retaliation claims based on § 3617, see infra notes 187–89 and accompanying
text.) In the course of granting summary judgment for the defendants, however, the Sporn court
did express specific concerns about interpreting § 3617 too broadly in cases involving neighbor
harassment, commenting that § 3617 does not “impose a code of civility” on neighbors nor does
it “require that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each other.” 173 F. Supp. 2d at
251. For a further discussion of Sporn, see infra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
100 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
101 Id. at 1092–93.
102 Id. at 1093.
103 Id. Based on this standard, the Egan court dismissed the FHA claim with leave to
amend the complaint to add an allegation that the defendants’ harassment was “designed to
drive [the plaintiffs] out of [their] home.” Id.
104 914 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
105 Id. at 1053 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 According to the Weisz court, the complaint’s allegations
recite nothing more than a series of skirmishes in an unfortunate war between
neighbors. There is no indication in any of these allegations that defendant Weisz
was feuding with the Cronins because Weisz was Jewish and the Cronins were
Roman Catholic. For all that appears from the complaint’s factual allegations, Weisz
was offended by the Cronins’ conduct, not by their faith. For all that appears, Weisz
would have been just as offended by the Cronins’ alleged offensive behavior, public
intoxication, basketball pole, trespass upon Weisz’s property and harassment of her
children if the Cronins had also been Orthodox Jews; or for that matter,
Episcopalians, Baptists, Mohammedans, Buddhists, agnostics, or atheists.
Id. at 1054–55.
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“add Jewish elements into the narrative, [but] they reflect nothing
more than the defendant’s methods of making life miserable for the
Cronins. They do not support an inference that Weisz wished to make
life miserable for the Cronins because they were Roman
Catholics.”107 As a result, Weisz held that the conduct alleged “does
not fall within § 3617,”108 opining that a § 3617 complaint
must allege conduct on the part of a defendant which in some
way or other implicates the concerns expressed by Congress
in the FHA. If it were otherwise, the FHA would federalize
any dispute involving residences and people who live in
them. Nothing in the statute or its legislative history supports
so startling a proposition.109
None of these cases produced an appellate decision, but the
Eleventh Circuit did decide a case with somewhat similar facts in
Sofarelli v. Pinellas County,110 which involved a white homeowner
who allegedly was harassed by the defendant-neighbors because they
feared he would rent to blacks.111 The district court dismissed
Sofarelli’s § 3617 claim, but the court of appeals reversed, holding
that the neighbors’ “leaving a note threatening ‘to break [Sofarelli] in
half’ if he did not get out of the neighborhood and running up to one
of Sofarelli’s trucks, hitting it, shouting obscenities and spitting at
Sofarelli,” along with making racial slurs in a local newspaper,
constituted actionable behavior under § 3617.112 In addition to
Sofarelli, a number of appellate courts decided sex harassment cases
that included § 3617 claims, but these decisions followed the lead of
earlier sex-based cases in not providing a detailed analysis of the
107 Id.

at 1055.

108 Id.
109 Id.

at 1054.
F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991).
at 720–21. Sofarelli’s complaint alleged that his efforts to transport his house by
trailer had been interfered with by county officials and his prospective new neighbors. Id. at
720. The claims against the county defendants, which were based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were
dismissed by the trial court, a ruling that was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 722–23.
112 Id. at 721–22 (alteration in original). The defendant-neighbors stated in a local
newspaper article that they “don’t want the house on their block partly because they’re afraid
black people might move in,” and “What’s stopping him (Sofarelli) from selling it to coloreds?
. . . Once that happens, the whole neighborhood is gone.” Id. at 722 (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In reversing the trial court’s dismissal of Sofarelli’s § 3617
claim against these defendants, the Eleventh Circuit held that their alleged behavior “clearly
constitute[s] coercion and intimidation under § 3617” and that, if the proof showed that the
neighbors “interfered with the house move in order to prevent someone of a particular race from
being able to move into their neighborhood, Sofarelli would be able to establish a colorable
claim against them under the Fair Housing Act.” Id.
110 931
111 Id.
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plaintiffs’ § 3617 claims separate from their § 3604 claims—both of
which were thought to be governed by a “severe or pervasive”
standard.113
3. Summary of Neighbor Harassment Case Law
Cases decided before Halprin generally recognized that minority
homeowners could invoke § 3617 to challenge invidiously motivated
harassment by their neighbors. Halprin jolted this consensus by
suggesting that nothing in the FHA should be interpreted to provide
protection for current residents unless they were forced out of their
homes, but this suggestion was ultimately rejected by Bloch.
After Bloch, the question has again become not whether neighbor
harassment can justify a § 3617 claim, but how egregious such
harassment must be. One HUD administrative decision in the 1990s
held that a single hostile conversation could suffice; but many courts,
including the Seventh Circuit in Bloch, opined that § 3617 should be
interpreted to require sufficiently abusive or systematic behavior so as
not to apply to simple neighborhood quarrels.
But there are problems with this interpretation. To the extent this
interpretation seeks to impose the same “severe or pervasive”
standard on § 3617 that governs § 3604 sex harassment cases, it
ignores the independence of § 3617 from the FHA’s other substantive
provisions. In particular, it ignores the fact that the language in
§ 3617 is quite different from the prohibition of discriminatory “terms
and conditions” in § 3604(b) and Title VII, which is often invoked in
the sex harassment cases.114 Furthermore, imposing a “severe or
pervasive” standard on § 3617 ignores a key goal of the FHA: to

113 See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming HUD
ALJ’s decision, described infra note 262, that landlord violated both §§ 3604(b) and 3617);
DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling for defendant-landlord
based on conclusion that his harassment of female tenant did not meet the “severe or pervasive”
standard); Honce v. Vigel, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); see also Reeves v.
Carrollsburg Condo. Owners Ass’n, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.)
¶ 16,250, at 16,250.4–.6 (D.D.C. 1997), available at 1997 WL 1877201 (holding that the
plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile-environment sexual harassment by showing
that the defendant’s conduct met the “severe or pervasive” standard); SCHWEMM, supra note 28,
§ 11C:2 nn.35–36 (citing additional cases). Post-Halprin cases have followed the same pattern.
See, e.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming decision against
landlord under FHA’s basic prohibitions of housing harassment based on “severe or pervasive”
standard as well as under § 3617).
Like the pre-FHAA sex harassment cases, the defendants in these more modern cases were
sued in their role as housing providers, not neighbors. E.g., Quigley, 598 F.3d at 944–45;
Krueger, 115 F.3d at 489–90; DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1005–06; Honce, 1 F.3d at 1087–88.
114 For more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 214–25.
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encourage integration and therefore presumably to protect minority
families who make integrative moves.115
To be true to the text of § 3617—and therefore presumably to
Congress’s intent—a proper interpretation of § 3617 in neighbor
harassment cases must determine whether the defendant’s behavior
“interfere[d] with” the plaintiff’s “exercise or enjoyment of” a “right
granted or protected” by §§ 3603–3606.116 These are the three
elements that Bloch and other cases have recognized as required for a
§ 3617 claim, along with the requirement that the defendant be
motivated by an intent to discriminate. 117 The next Part examines
other sources that shed light on the meaning of these three elements
of § 3617.
III. MORE EVIDENCE ON WHAT § 3617 MEANS BY “TO INTERFERE
WITH” THE “EXERCISE OR ENJOYMENT OF” A “RIGHT”
PROTECTED BY §§ 3603–3606
A. Overview
Part II determined that some of the issues in neighbor harassment
cases require a further analysis of the key phrases used in § 3617.
This Part examines various sources of guidance as to the meaning of
these phrases. Section B examines § 3617’s legislative history.
Section C discusses HUD’s regulations interpreting the FHA. Section
D explores additional § 3617 cases, beyond those involving neighboron-neighbor harassment, as well as the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of Title VII’s analogous provision. Section E considers
First Amendment implications. Section F summarizes the insights
derived from these sources.
B. § 3617’s Legislative History
The legislative history of § 3617 contains no statements that
directly address the meaning of its key phrases, but some general
comments were made about this provision’s purpose, and its textual
evolution is worth recounting. Like most of the FHA’s other
substantive prohibitions enacted in 1968, § 3617 changed very little
during the two-year period that Congress dealt with this legislation.118
115 For

more on this point, see infra text accompanying notes 144–48.
the full text of § 3617, see supra text accompanying note 29.
117 See supra note 65 (quoting the test from Bloch).
118 For a detailed description of this two-year process, see Robert G. Schwemm,
Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORD. URB. L.J. 187, 197–200 (2001). For a description of how the
116 For
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The FHA’s legislative process began in 1966 when President Johnson
proposed a fair housing bill,119 which included a provision almost
identical to § 3617.120 Later in 1966, the House passed an amended
version of the Johnson bill with no changes to this provision,121 but
that bill failed in the Senate.122
In 1967, Senator Mondale introduced a new fair housing bill that
included some slight changes to § 3617’s predecessor.123 The
substantive language of Mondale’s version of § 3617 was ultimately
enacted in the 1968 FHA, reenacted in the 1988 FHAA, and remains
in effect today.124 In early 1968, the Mondale bill was proposed as an
amendment to another civil rights bill then pending on the Senate

FHA’s substantive provisions evolved, see id. at 200–06.
119 The Johnson Administration’s proposal was embodied in two identical bills. S. 3296,
89th Cong. (1966); H.R. 14765, 89th Cong. (1966). For the text of Senate Bill 3296, see 112
CONG. REC. 9394–97 (1966).
120 The bill’s version of § 3617 provided:
No person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of any right granted by section 403 or 404.
112 CONG. REC. 9397 (1966). The enacted version provided:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of
this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970) (emphasis added) (emphasizing the differences between the two).
121 See 112 CONG. REC. 18,739–40 (1966) (reporting the result of the roll-call vote for the
amended version of House Bill 14765).
122 See 112 CONG. REC. INDEX 1183 (1966) (describing House Bill 14765 and the Senate’s
inability to pass a motion for cloture on the bill).
123 S. 1358, 90th Cong. (1967). For the text of this bill, see Fair Housing Act of 1967:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking &
Currency on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing, 90th Cong.
439–59 (1967). Senate Bill 1358 was identical to the fair housing title of a civil rights bill
proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1967 (Senate Bill 1026 and House Bill 5700), a
copy of which is set forth in Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S.
1462, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805 Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, 90th Cong. 36–42 (1967).
Apart from the needed changes in the numbers of the referenced sections within this
provision, the Mondale version of § 3617 made only three changes to the original version, see
supra note 120, which were: (1) to add “or protected” to “any right granted . . . by” these
referenced sections; (2) to reorder the first three verbs; and (3) to change the introductory phrase
regarding how such behavior was forbidden, a change that was also made to the other
substantive provisions of the bill.
124 See supra notes 29, 120.
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floor.125 This amendment was later withdrawn in favor of a substitute
fair housing proposal offered by Senator Dirksen,126 which, with
minor amendments not relevant here, was eventually enacted.127
Senator Dirksen’s version of § 3617 was substantively identical to the
Mondale proposal.128
The evolution of § 3617 shows that virtually all of its key language
was in the original 1966 Johnson Administration proposal. What led
the drafters of this proposal to choose this language? None of the
Administration’s explanations regarding its proposed bill focused on
the specific words or purpose of § 3617.129 A congressional analysis
noted that it was “intended to protect Negroes and others from threats,
etc., not only by parties to any negotiation or prospective transaction
125 See 114 CONG. REC. 2270–72 (1968) (proposal printed); id. at 2279 (amendment
formally offered by Sen. Mondale).
126 For the text of the Dirksen proposal, see 114 CONG. REC. 4570–73 (1968).
127 See 114 CONG. REC. 9620–21 (1968) (House passage of Senate-passed version);
Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Act (Apr. 11, 1968), in 1 PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1968–69, at 509–10
(1970) (presidential signing). For a description of the Senate amendments, see Schwemm, supra
note 118, at 205 n.76.
128 See bills cited supra notes 119, 121, 123; see also 114 CONG. REC. 9612 (1968) (noting,
in a comparative analysis of Dirksen’s Senate-passed version of § 3617 and the 1966 Housepassed version of this provision, that these versions were “comparable”).
The Dirksen proposal did, however, relocate this provision toward the end of the statute
and provided for its enforcement only by “appropriate civil action” rather than pursuant to the
private enforcement procedures set up for other FHA violations. 114 CONG. REC. 4570–73
(1968). All prior versions, beginning with the original Johnson Administration proposal, had
placed § 3617’s predecessor immediately after the bill’s other substantive prohibitions and made
all of these prohibitions subject to the FHA’s enforcement procedures. See bills cited supra
notes 119, 121, 123. Senator Dirksen offered no explanation for these changes. See 114 CONG.
REC. 4574 (1968) (statement of Sen. Dirksen). In any event, this change in § 3617 by Senator
Dirksen was the one reversed by the 1988 FHAA, see supra note 29 and accompanying text,
which means that the original Johnson Administration proposal regarding § 3617 is procedurally
consistent with the modern version of this provision, as well as being nearly identical
substantively.
129 The Attorney General’s explanation of the overall bill included only general statements
about coverage. 112 CONG. REC. 9399 (1966). With respect to the provision that became
§ 3617, the Attorney General merely stated that this provision would “prohibit coercion,
intimidation or interference with the right of a person to obtain housing and its financing
without discrimination or to aid others in exercising such rights.” Id. With respect to the bill’s
overall substantive provisions, he noted, “The bill would reach . . . such acts as mobs blocking a
minority-group family from moving into a neighborhood . . . .” Id. The Attorney General also
noted that a related title provided for criminal prosecutions for those who interfered by the use
of force or the threat of force in “activities protected by Federal law or the Constitution.” Id. For
more on this related criminal provision, see supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
In its 1968 analysis of the Dirksen proposal, the Justice Department simply listed the bill’s
various prohibitions, including those contained in § 3617, without providing any additional
explanation of their specific meaning. 114 CONG. REC. 4906–08 (1968). As for § 3617, the
Justice Department stated, “The bill would also make it unlawful to coerce, intimidate threaten
or interfere with persons seeking to exercise or enjoy the rights granted or protected by [this
title].” Id. at 4908.
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but from any third parties who seek to forestall the same” and that it
“reaches similar conduct in retaliation for having negotiated the
purchase or rental of a dwelling and/or for having consummated the
same.”130 This analysis also noted that “there is some doubt whether
[the other substantive] sections protect persons against retaliation
because they have filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any
proceeding under this title”131 and that “Congress on other occasions
has expressly provided [such] a safeguard.”132
But the language proposed for the FHA was significantly broader
than the antiretaliation provisions in these other laws. For example,
the comparable Title VII provision bars only employers and the three
other entities covered by Title VII from discriminating against
employees and other persons they deal with because those persons
have “opposed any practice made . . . unlawful” by Title VII or made
a charge or otherwise “participated in any manner in [a Title VII]
investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”133 In contrast, the Johnson
Administration’s proposal for what became § 3617 went beyond Title
VII’s provision in two major ways by: (1) using four separate verbs to
describe the forbidden behavior, rather than requiring a defendant “to
discriminate against” someone; and (2) describing three types of
protected activities that go beyond Title VII’s protection of those who
have “opposed” unlawful practices or “participated” in Title VII
proceedings.134 Under well-established principles of statutory
construction, Congress’s decision to make these additions, once

130 112 CONG. REC. 18,117 (1966) (written submission of the Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress).
131 Id. at 18,118.
132 Id. As a footnote to this observation, the analysis cited the antiretaliation provisions of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and a New York State
fair housing law that outlawed “similar conduct.” Id. n.*; see also infra note 133 and
accompanying text (quoting Title VII).
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). For a discussion of Supreme Court cases interpreting
this provision, see infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
134 In addition, the proposal for § 3617 went beyond its Title VII counterpart in at least two
more ways: (1) by making the behavior described unlawful, regardless of who engages in it; and
(2) by describing the victim of such unlawful behavior as “any person,” instead of limiting
protection to those in an employment or other business relationship with the defendant.
A related piece of evidence that Congress intended to broaden the scope of § 3617 is the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (2006), which banned
many of the same employment practices outlawed by Title VII if engaged in because of age, id.
§ 623, and which included an antiretaliation provision that used language virtually identical to
Title VII’s, id. § 623(d). Thus, in the same time period that Congress was adopting language for
§ 3617 that went well beyond Title VII’s comparable provision, it was choosing not to make
such additions to a different civil rights statute that it felt was more similar to, and should
remain verbally consistent with, Title VII.
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enacted, must be seen an intentional effort to add substantive
coverage to the FHA’s provision.135
Although not mentioned in the FHA’s legislative history, two
other recently enacted civil rights statutes contained antiharassment
provisions that were more similar to the language proposed in 1966
for § 3617 than Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. One was Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose prohibitions against
discrimination in public accommodations were followed by a
provision declaring that “[n]o person shall . . . intimidate, threaten, or
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with
the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [the
substantive provisions] of this title.”136 The other was the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), which made it unlawful for anyone to
“intimidate, threaten, or coerce” any person for voting, attempting to
vote, or “urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote,” or
“exercising any power or duties under” the VRA’s other substantive
provisions.137
135 These principles include, first and foremost, that a statute’s text is the primary source of
its meaning. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1107
(2011) (“We begin, as in any case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”)
(citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010))); Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The starting point for [the]
interpretation of a statute is always its language.” (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 44 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))). As a corollary, another basic tenet of statutory
construction requires that every word or phrase in the text be accorded some meaning. See, e.g.,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228–29 (2010) (invoking the “canon [of statutory
interpretation] against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render
another provision superfluous” (citing Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009)));
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2288 (2010) (“[W]e should not construe the statute in a
manner that . . . would render a statutory term superfluous.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (noting that a court must give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006) (analyzing the language of Title VII’s substantive and
antiretaliation provisions); supra note 60 (analyzing the language of § 3617).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(b) (2006). For early cases decided under this provision, see United
States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 356 (E.D. La. 1965) (enjoining
private individuals and organizations from engaging in behavior that “intimidated, harassed, and
in other ways interfered with the civil rights of Negroes” in violation of Title II and other federal
laws); United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Ala. 1965) (enjoining city and county
law enforcement officials from interfering with blacks who asserted their Title II rights); see
also United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (upholding criminal convictions under 18
U.S.C. § 241 of defendants who physically assaulted blacks seeking to exercise their Title II
rights). Title II’s antiharassment provisions have produced few reported cases since the FHA’s
enactment in 1968.
137 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b); see also id. § 1973j(c) (providing criminal sanctions for anyone
who “interferes with any right secured by” the VRA). The VRA’s antiharassment provisions
have produced few reported decisions. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804–05
(9th Cir. 1985) (declining to recognize a private right of action for damages under § 1973i(b)).
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This language in the VRA was described in an early § 3617
decision as “essentially identical” to § 3617’s,138 but this is not
accurate. Although use of the three verbs “intimidate, threaten, or
coerce” in both the VRA and Title II does appear to have been copied
in the 1966 proposal that became § 3617, the latter’s addition of a
fourth verb—“interfere with”—along with its articulation of the
activities protected are noteworthy differences. These changes must
be considered important additions to a proper interpretion of
§ 3617.139 As we have seen, § 3617’s addition of “interfere with” is
particularly crucial to resolving the issue at the heart of this Article. 140
To summarize, the FHA’s § 3617 is now much like it was when
originally proposed in 1966. It was described then as an antiretaliation
provision comparable to Title VII’s,141 and indeed it does protect
those who are later discriminated against for asserting their FHA
rights.142 But § 3617’s broader language shows that it was intended to
do much more. Whether this broader scope of § 3617 covers
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment turns on two issues: (1) what types
of behavior are included in the four verbs used—particularly
“interfere with”; and (2) whether this behavior is directed at its target
because the latter was engaged “in the exercise or enjoyment of” a
“right granted or protected by” the FHA’s §§ 3603–3606. The
legislative history of § 3617 provides little guidance in answering
these questions.
An additional comment about the FHA’s general legislative
history is worth making here.143 As the Bloch opinion noted in
construing § 3617 to apply to some types of neighbor harassment,
such a construction is “consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting
the FHA—‘the reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos
by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”144 The Bloch court
here was quoting the Supreme Court’s first FHA decision, Trafficante

138 Northside

Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Chapman, 411 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
supra note 135 and accompanying text.
supra Part II.B. For additional discussion of the meaning of § 3617’s “interferes
with” phrase, see infra Part III.D.2.
141 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
143 See generally Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct.
1605, 1615 (2010) (examining statute’s “context and history” in order to provide additional
support for the Court’s reading of its text, and noting that “[i]n reading a statute we must not
look merely to a particular clause, but consider in connection with it the whole statute” (quoting
Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)).
139 See
140 See
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v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,145 which in turn had quoted
Senator Mondale as advocating this statute as a way of replacing the
ghettos “by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”146 Clearly,
the goal of racial integration was important to the Congress that
passed the 1968 FHA.147 As Bloch recognized, the congressional
desire that the FHA result in integrated living patterns has important
implications for the proper interpretation of § 3617 in neighbor-onneighbor harassment cases.148 This lesson will be further explored
later.149
C. HUD’s § 3617 Regulation
In early 1989, HUD issued a lengthy set of FHA regulations that
became effective along with the amendments adopted by the 1988
FHAA on March 12, 1989.150 Each of the FHA’s substantive
145 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). Trafficante was a unanimous decision upholding the standing
of white residents of a large apartment complex to complain about their landlord’s racial
discrimination against black applicants. For more on this case’s guides to interpreting the FHA,
see infra note 201.
146 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Mondale)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968) (additional
remarks of Senator Mondale decrying the prospect that “we are going to live separately in white
ghettos and Negro ghettos”); id. at 2275–76, 2279 (additional remarks of Senator Mondale
stating that the FHA reflects Congress’s commitment “to the principle of living together” and to
promoting integrated neighborhoods where residents of difference races would live together in
“harmony”).
147 In addition to Senator Mondale’s comments, supra note 146 and accompanying text,
proponents of the FHA in both the Senate and the House repeatedly argued that it was intended
not only to expand housing choices for individual minorities, but also to foster racial integration
for the benefit of all Americans. On the House side, for example, Congressman Cellar, the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, spoke of the need to eliminate the “blight of segregated
housing and the pale of the ghetto,” 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1968), and Congressman Ryan saw
the FHA as a way to help “achieve the aim of an integrated society,” id. at 9591. According to
Senator Javits, the intended beneficiaries of the FHA were not only blacks and other minority
groups, but “the whole community.” Id. at 2706. In general, Congress was aware of the recently
published conclusion of the National Commission on Civil Disorders that the nation was
dividing into two racially separate societies, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 5:2 nn.12–20 and
accompanying text, and thus intended the FHA to remedy segregated housing patterns and the
problems associated with them—segregated schools, lost suburban job opportunities for
minorities, and the alienation of whites and blacks caused by the “lack of experience in actually
living next to” each other. Id. at 2275 (statement of Senator Mondale); see also Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94–95 (1977) (stating that Congress in the
FHA “made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing” for the benefit of
“both whites and blacks” (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205)). For more on the integration theme
in the FHA’s legislative history, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, §§ 2:3, 7:3.
148 Accord United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977–78 (D. Neb. 2004)
(interpreting § 3617 broadly based in part on recognition of Congress’s desire in the FHA to
eliminate housing discrimination and to promote harmony in innercity neighborhoods).
149 See infra notes 275–81 and accompanying text.
150 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg.
3232–3317 (Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at scattered parts of 24 C.F.R.).
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provisions, including § 3617, was the subject of one or more of these
regulations.151 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,152 these
regulations must be given substantial deference in interpreting the
FHA153—i.e., courts must follow these regulations so long as they are
a “permissible” or “reasonable” construction of the FHA.154
The regulation interpreting § 3617 first tracks the statutory
language of this provision and then identifies five types of conduct
outlawed by § 3617.155 Among the types of conduct identified as
unlawful, and the one most relevant to the problem of neighbor
harassment, is: “Threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons
in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or of
visitors or associates of such persons.”156
151 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50–.148 (2010) (regulating discriminatory housing practices and
residential real estate–related transactions). For a discussion of the § 3617 regulation, which
appears in section 100.400, see infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
152 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
153 See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003) (relying on HUD regulation to
interpret the FHA). For a list of decisions that have accorded deference to HUD’s FHA
regulations, see SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 7:5 n.17. For more on Chevron deference in the
context of § 3617 cases involving neighbor harassment, see infra notes 263–67 and
accompanying text.
154 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45 (instructing that unless “Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue”—i.e., the statute “unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress”—courts are to follow an agency’s regulations so long as they are a “permissible” or
“reasonable” construction of the statute, giving them “controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
155 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400. The five types of unlawful conduct are identified in
subsection (c) of this regulation, which states that the conduct made unlawful by § 3617
“includes, but is not limited to” these five examples. Id. § 100.400(c).
156 Id. § 100.400(c)(2). The four other types of unlawful conduct identified in this
regulation are:

(1) Coercing a person, either orally, in writing, or by other means, to deny or
limit the benefits provided that person in connection with the sale or rental of a
dwelling or in connection with a residential real estate-related transaction because of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. . . .
(3) Threatening an employee or agent with dismissal or an adverse employment
action, or taking such adverse employment action, for any effort to assist a person
seeking access to the sale or rental of a dwelling or seeking access to any residential
real estate-related transaction, because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin of that person or of any person associated with that
person.
(4) Intimidating or threatening any person because that person is engaging in
activities designed to make other persons aware of, or encouraging such other
persons to exercise, rights granted or protected by this part.
(5) Retaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair
Housing Act.
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In connection with issuing its FHA regulations, HUD also
published extensive comments on these regulations. The comments
relating to the § 3617 regulation noted that the conduct outlawed by
this provision can “involve harassment of persons because of race [or
other prohibited factor],”157 and that the regulation’s illustrations of
prohibited conduct “indicate that a broad range of activities can
constitute a discriminatory housing practice.”158 The HUD
commentary also stated that “persons who are not involved in any
aspect of the sale or rental of a dwelling are nonetheless prohibited
from engaging in conduct to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere
with persons in connection with protected activities.”159
This last comment reflects § 3617’s legislative history and
confirms prior case law holding that neighbors’ conduct may be
subject to § 3617.160 Also, in outlawing invidiously motivated
interference with “persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling,”161
HUD’s regulation provided important support for the proposition that

Id. § 100.400(c).
Paragraph (1) may apply to neighbor harassment, but it is limited to “coercing” behavior,
whereas paragraph (2), see supra text accompanying note 155, uses § 3617’s other three verbs
(i.e., “threatening, intimidating or interfering with”). Paragraphs (3) and (4) deal with situations
where the target of the unlawful behavior is a housing provider or other person engaged in
“aiding or encouraging” others to exercise their FHA rights. For more on this type of § 3617
case, see infra notes 176 and 182–85 and accompanying text. Paragraph (5) deals with
retaliation against persons who have filed or helped with FHA complaints. For more on this type
of § 3617 case, see infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
157 Implementation of Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3257 (Jan. 23,
1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
158 Id. Among such prohibited activities, the HUD commentary identified: “Threatening or
intimidating actions include acts against the possessions of persons, such as damage to
automobiles or vandalism, which limit a person’s ability to have full enjoyment of a dwelling.”
Id.
159 Id.
160 For a discussion of § 3617’s legislative history, see supra note 129; supra text
accompanying note 130. For prior case law involving neighbors’ conduct, see supra notes 72–
76 and 80–81 and accompanying text.
Given the fact that the 1988 FHAA reenacted verbatim § 3617’s substantive prohibitions,
see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text, Congress presumably intended to incorporate
settled judicial interpretations into the meaning of this provision. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle,
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1616 (2010) (“We have often observed
that when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’” (omission in original) (quoting Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998))). For purposes of this doctrine, a settled judicial
interpretation may be based on a limited number of lower court opinions. See id. (employing
this doctrine based on three federal appellate decisions).
161 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2); see also supra note 158 (setting forth HUD commentary that
actions in violation of § 3617 include those that “limit a person’s ability to have full enjoyment
of a dwelling”).
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current residents may invoke § 3617’s protections. Again, this
proposition simply reflected § 3617’s prior case law and general
legislative history,162 but reinforcing this view apparently was
necessary, as demonstrated by some courts’ subsequent willingness to
ignore these sources and suggest that § 3617 did not apply to
neighbor-on-neighbor or any other form of postacquisition
harassment.163
Unfortunately, one thing HUD’s regulation and commentary on
§ 3617 did not do was to give any significant insight into the meaning
of the four verbs used in this provision to define the behavior it bans.
Thus, for example, the HUD regulation that is most relevant to
neighbor harassment simply parrots the statutory language by
outlawing “[t]hreatening, intimidating, or interfering with” persons in
the enjoyment of their homes.164 True, the concept of “enjoyment”
mentioned here as the key to § 3617’s scope may have implications
for how “interfere with” and the other verbs used should be
interpreted, as does HUD’s commentary that “a broad range of
activities” may violate § 3617.165 But these are merely suggestive; the
fact is that HUD has not provided a working definition for § 3617’s
verbs. For guidance on this issue, we must turn to other sources.
D. Precedents from Other Types of § 3617 Cases and
Title VII’s Analogous Provision
1. Overview: § 3617’s Independence from §§ 3603–3606 Violations
In addition to neighbor-on-neighbor harassments cases, § 3617 has
produced two other distinct types of claims.166 One is brought by
housing providers who claim that their efforts to help protected-class
members have been interfered with in violation of § 3617’s protection
162 See supra notes 47, 49, 82 and accompanying text (prior case law allowing current
residents to invoke § 3617); supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text (legislative history of
the FHA); see also supra note 160 (prior case law and legislative history suggesting that
neighbors’ conduct is subject to § 3617).
163 See supra notes 44–45, 48 and accompanying text (discussing case law that interprets
§ 3617 as not extending to postacquisition disputes).
164 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2).
165 Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3257 (Jan.
23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also supra text accompanying note 158
(discussing HUD’s commentary on its § 3617 regulation).
166 In addition, some § 3617 cases do not fit neatly into any of these categories. See, e.g.,
United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(upholding § 3617 claim against certain appraisal organizations that were accused of supporting
the practice of evaluating houses based in part on racial demographics and observing that § 3617
has been “broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the
exercise of rights under the Act”), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
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of persons who have “aided or encouraged” others in the exercise or
enjoyment of their FHA rights.167 Another type of § 3617 claim is
analogous to retaliation claims under Title VII,168 and thus reflects
§ 3617’s historical link to Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.169 This
type of claim alleges harm suffered as a result of the plaintiff having
filed or otherwise helped with a FHA complaint.170 All types of
§ 3617 cases have had occasion to interpret what § 3617 means by
“interfere with” and what this provision’s relationship to §§ 3603–
3606 “rights” should be.
The relationship of a § 3617 claim to the provisions it refers to has
never been clear.171 As late as 2004, Judge Posner suggested that
§ 3617 could not extend beyond violations of §§ 3603–3606.172
Although this view was subsequently corrected in Bloch,173 decisions
in the post-Bloch era still occasionally opine, albeit wrongly, that a
plaintiff is not permitted “to assert a § 3617 claim without
establishing a viable claim as to a substantive violation of rights
protected under the statute.”174
One reason for this confusion is that a large portion of § 3617
cases, including Halprin and Bloch,175 have challenged behavior that
allegedly violated both § 3617 and one or more of the FHA’s other
provisions, with the courts generally focusing primarily on the non§ 3617 claims. Examples include many early FHA cases brought by
housing developers in their role as “aiders” of minorities’ housing
rights. These cases often involved a defendant-municipality’s refusal
to allow construction of affordable housing for minorities. The refusal
was challenged as violating §§ 3603–3606 as well as “interfering
167 For

more on this type of § 3617 claim, see infra notes 177, 183–86 and accompanying

text.
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (outlawing discrimination against employees “for
making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating” in proceedings under Title VII). For more
on the meaning of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, see infra notes 216–30 and
accompanying text.
169 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting the discussion of Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision in the legislative history of § 3617).
170 For more on such retaliation claims under § 3617, see infra notes 187–89 and
accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(commenting, almost thirty years after passage of the FHA, that “[t]he necessity of a nexus
between § 3617 and the sections enumerated therein is not free from doubt”).
172 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330
(7th Cir. 2004).
173 See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (discussing Bloch).
174 H & J Consulting Servs., LLC v. City of Gainesville, Ga., No. 2:08-CV-0028-WCO,
slip op. at 19 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2010).
175 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 53 and
accompanying text (discussing Bloch).
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with” the developer and its prospective tenants in violation of
§ 3617.176 In such cases where the plaintiffs prevailed, courts
typically noted that their finding of § 3617 liability was based solely
on the defendant’s violation of another FHA provision, usually
§ 3604(a).177 Similarly, in cases where the defendants prevailed, a
number of decisions gave short shrift to the § 3617 claim once the
court determined that no violation of the FHA’s other substantive
prohibitions had occurred.178 Thus, the § 3617 claim in these cases
turned out, as a practical matter, to be superfluous. For some courts in
the 1970s, this raised the question whether a § 3617 violation could

176 See, e.g., United States v. City of Birmingham, Mich., 727 F.2d 560, 561 (6th Cir.
1984) (city prevented the development of low-income senior-citizen and family housing);
United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974) (city charged
with passing a zoning ordinance that interfered with the right of equal housing opportunity);
United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1095–1101 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (city
persistently resisted construction of low-income housing), aff’d as modified on other grounds,
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981); land-use cases cited infra notes 177–78; see also Malone v. City
of Fenton, Mo., 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1156 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that plaintiff-developer has
standing under § 3617’s “interference with persons who aid” language), aff’d without opinion,
794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346, 352 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) (holding, in case brought by housing developer, that “§ 3617 grants a right of action to
persons who have been interfered with as they aided others in their exercise of rights protected
by § 3604”).
177 E.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th
Cir. 1977) (noting that the defendant’s violation of § 3617 depends on § 3604(a)); Atkins v.
Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 865–866 (E.D. Va. 1982) (noting that the validity of the § 3617
claim depends “on whether the defendants’ veto of the proposed development ran afoul of
§ 3604” (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 n.5)), aff’d, 733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
1984); see also Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1111
(S.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that the defendant’s insurance redlining, having been found to violate
§ 3604, “also violates § 3617”).
178 E.g., Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the plaintiffs asserted that the city violated their rights under §§ 3604 and 3617, but deciding for
the defendants after finding that “the evidence does not support a violation of Section 3604(a)”);
Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1531–32 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (implicitly
applying the same standard for both §§ 3604 and 3617); Malone, 592 F. Supp. at 1165–66
(“[T]his Court will not separately analyze plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim because the § 3604(a)
analysis applies equally to said claim.”); see also Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n
v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that, in a case alleging that
residents of minority neighborhood were harmed by county’s failure to maintain its tax
delinquent properties in the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, plaintiffs’ § 3617 and § 3604(a) claims
could be analyzed together).
For more modern versions of the same phenomenon, see Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361,
365 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim after holding against their § 3604
claim on the ground that the “harassment claim . . . does nothing to advance their discrimination
claim”); AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03 (N.D. Tex.
2009) (agreeing with the defendant in exclusionary-zoning case that plaintiff-developer, having
lost on its § 3604(a) and (b) claims, cannot pursue a § 3617 claim); infra note 249 and
accompanying text (citing additional cases that preclude a § 3617 claim if a violation of § 3604
is not proven).
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occur without the defendant’s conduct having also violated §§ 3603–
3606.179
Many early FHA decisions, however, did recognize that § 3617
creates a cause of action independent of the statute’s other substantive
provisions.180 The most important of these was the Ninth Circuit’s
1975 decision in Smith v. Stechel,181 which upheld a § 3617 claim by
two apartment managers who had been fired for not carrying out their
employer’s orders not to rent to minorities.182
As the Stechel opinion pointed out, this type of case involves a
situation where the minorities’ §§ 3603–3606 rights “have actually
been respected by persons who suffer consequent retaliation,”183 and
thus the plaintiffs come within that part of § 3617 that protects
179 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1288 n.5 (“We decline to decide
whether section 3617 can ever be violated by conduct that does not violate any of the four
earlier sections.”); Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1111 (“It is unclear whether a violation of § 3617 can
be established without first establishing a violation of §§ 3604, 3605 or 3606.”).
180 See, e.g., Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d 171, 173 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Section 3617 provides
a separate cause of action . . . .”); Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“Section 3617 does not necessarily deal with a discriminatory housing practice . . . .”); New
York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1103–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[E]ven if a
claim is not made out under §§ 3603–3606, a claim may still be maintained pursuant to
§ 3617 . . . .”); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“We now hold
that § 3617 may be violated absent a violation of § 3603, 3604, 3605 or 3606.”); Laufman v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 497–98 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (commenting that “a
reasonable and practical interpretation of § 3617” allows for an independent violation); see also
Malone, 592 F. Supp. at 1166 (recognizing in dicta that “[t]here are situations where a § 3617
violation may occur without a violation of § 3604(a)”); cases cited infra notes 185, 188 (dealing
on the merits with claims based solely on § 3617).
181 510 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975).
182 Id. at 1163–64. According to the Stechel opinion, § 3617 was the only FHA provision
“applicable to the facts of this case.” Id. at 1164. The Ninth Circuit then noted:

Section 3617 does not necessarily deal with a discriminatory housing practice, or
with the landlord, financer or brokerage service guilty of such practice. It deals with
a situation where no discriminatory housing practice may have occurred at all
because the would-be tenant has been discouraged from asserting his rights, or
because the rights have actually been respected by persons who suffer consequent
retaliation. It also deals with situations in which the fundamental inequity of a
discriminatory housing practice is compounded by coercion, intimidation, threat or
interference.
Id.
In Stechel, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’
§ 3617 claims for being untimely under the FHA’s private enforcement provisions. Id. Stechel
held that, unlike claims under §§ 3603–3606, § 3617 was not made subject to the limitations
period of these other provisions. Id.; accord Warner, 585 F.2d at 173 (noting that § 3617
includes no time limitation); Merlino, 694 F. Supp. at 1103 (“There is persuasive authority for
the proposition that Congress ‘designedly’ refrained from including § 3617 within the limitation
period of § 3612 . . . .”). As described above, the 1968 FHA’s alternative enforcement system
for § 3617 claims was later eliminated by the 1988 amendments to this statute. For a discussion
of the 1988 changes, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
183 510 F.2d at 1164.
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persons who are harmed “on account of . . . having aided or
encouraged” others in exercising their FHA rights.184 After Stechel, a
number of other decisions upheld such “aided or encouraged” claims
by real estate agents who were fired or otherwise harmed for not
discriminating against minorities.185 These holdings were confirmed
in HUD’s 1989 regulation dealing with § 3617, which specifically
outlaws “adverse employment actions” against employees and agents
for assisting others in obtaining housing free from discrimination.186
Another situation in which a § 3617 claim may arise without a
violation of the FHA’s other substantive provisions involves
retaliation against someone who has filed or otherwise participated in
a FHA proceeding.187 Only a few such § 3617 cases were reported
before passage of the 1988 FHAA,188 but many more have occurred
since then.189
The exact relationship between § 3617 and the substantive
provisions it refers to will be discussed in greater detail later. 190 For
now, it seems clear, based on HUD’s regulations and case law, that a
§ 3617 claim may be made without an outright violation of §§ 3603–
3606.191 This is crucial for neighbor-on-neighbor harassment cases.
184 42

U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). For the full text of § 3617, see supra text accompanying note

29.
185 See,

e.g., Wilkey v. Pyramid Constr. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 (D. Conn. 1985)
(allowing a rental agent who “refus[ed] to execute her employer’s allegedly racially
discriminatory housing policies” to invoke § 3617); Meadows v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 432
F. Supp. 334, 337 (W.D. Va. 1977) (holding that, although a cause of action exists for retaliation
for aid and encouragement, the resident-apartment-manager plaintiffs failed to prove their case
by a preponderance of the evidence); Tokaji v. Toth, 1 EOHC Rep. (P-H) ¶ 13,679 (N.D. Ohio
1974) (denying the defendant-landlord’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claim brought by managers
of an apartment building he owned for allegedly evicting them after they refused to follow his
policy of not renting to blacks); see also Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423,
424 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (stating that a city housing social services coordinator “discharged for his
efforts to secure fair housing rights for others . . . would clearly have a cause of action under
§ 3617”).
186 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(3) (2010). For the full text of § 100.400(c)(3), see supra note
156.
187 HUD’s regulation recognizes § 3617’s coverage of this situation, see supra note 156
(quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5)), and reflects § 3617’s historical link to Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
188 Two of the few examples were Izard v. Arndt, 483 F. Supp. 261, 264–65 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (dismissing § 3617 claims by fair housing organization and its director based on
landlords’ suit against them allegedly for helping a black couple bring FHA claims against the
landlords), and Meadows, 432 F. Supp. at 336–37 (rejecting for lack of factual support § 3617
claim by apartment managers who were fired allegedly for helping black tenant assert her FHA
rights by filing a HUD complaint).
189 See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:5 nn.2–3 (collecting cases); cases cited supra
note 99; infra notes 196–205 and accompanying text.
190 See infra Part III.D.3.
191 Several post-FHAA cases have also endorsed this proposition, including Bloch. See
Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1126–31 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. City of
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The would-be defendants in such cases are often not themselves
housing providers, i.e., could generally not be the target of a §§ 3603–
3606 claim for, say, making housing “unavailable” under § 3604(a) or
for imposing discriminatory “terms or conditions” under § 3604(b).192
In the most violent types of neighbor abuse, as illustrated by Judge
Posner’s arson hypothetical in Halprin,193 the offending behavior may
be so severe that it “constructively evicts” the minority plaintiffs from
their home, thereby prompting a § 3604(a) “make unavailable” claim
as well as a § 3617 “interference” claim.194 Short of such an extreme

Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1994); Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–79 (D. Neb. 2004); United States
v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063–64 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Fowler v. Borough of Westville,
97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 n.7 (D.N.J. 2000); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092–93
(N.D. Cal. 2000); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239–43
(E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562 (D. Kan. 1992); Johnson v.
Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238–39 (N.D. Ill. 1992); HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending
Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041, at 25,424 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 246392;
case cited supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text; cf. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 59–67 (2006) (interpreting Title VII’s antiretaliation provision separately
from the statute’s other substantive provisions).
Decisions to the contrary continue to be issued within the Fifth Circuit, which initially
chose to follow Halprin, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, and has not yet corrected
this position with a Bloch-like decision. See, e.g., AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633
F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of CoOwners, Inc., 235 Fed. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (described supra note 59)); McZeal v. Ocwen
Fin. Corp., 252 F.3d 1355, 2001 WL 422375, at *2 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam
decision stating that “[b]ecause his § 3605 claim fails, [plaintiff’s] claim under § 3617 must also
fail”); see also Petty v. Portofino Council of Coowners, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728–30 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (following Cox in holding that § 3617, along with § 3604(a) and (b), requires that a
defendant’s conduct affect “the availability of housing, not merely the habitability of housing,”
but finding the plaintiffs’ complaint adequate in alleging that the defendant made its
condominium complex unavailable on a nondiscriminatory basis).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 31–32 (quoting these provisions in full); cf. Woods
v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (suggesting that sexual-harassment claim
against nonprofit homeless shelter may be more appropriate under § 3617 than § 3604(a)
because the former provision “is not limited to acts of ‘sale’ or ‘rental’”). In some situations,
however, would-be defendants are both neighbors and housing-opportunity providers. For
example, in both Halprin and Bloch, the defendants were neighbors as well as officers of a
condominium board or the local homeowners’ association. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text (discussing Halprin); supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing
Bloch). This also often occurs in sex harassment cases where the defendant is a landlord
who lives near the plaintiff. See supra note 113.
193 See supra note 40.
194 Another, albeit nonviolent, example of how similar conduct might violate §§ 3604 and
3617 is provided in the HUD regulations, which identify, as respective §§ 3604(a) and 3617
violations, “[d]ischarging or taking other adverse action against an employee, broker or agent
because he or she refused to participate in a discriminatory housing practice” and “[t]hreatening
an employee or agent with dismissal or an adverse employment action, or taking such adverse
employment action, for any effort to assist a person seeking” nondiscriminatory access to
housing. 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(d)(1), 100.400(c)(3) (2010). This example also demonstrates,
however, how a § 3617 violation may occur without a corresponding § 3604 violation (e.g.,
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example, however, a minority family who is the target of a neighbor’s
invidiously motivated harassment may well not have a claim against
that neighbor under any FHA provision other than § 3617.
2. The Meaning of “Interfere With” in § 3617 and
Title VII’s Analogous Provision
The problem here is to determine how egregious a neighbor’s
conduct toward a minority resident must be before it “interferes with”
that persons’s fair housing rights in violation of § 3617. Courts in
other types of § 3617 cases generally agree that an interference claim
need not involve violent behavior and at least some forms of verbal
abuse will suffice.195 Beyond this, however, judicial opinions have
expressed quite different views about how broadly § 3617’s
“interferes with” phrase should be interpreted. Two decisions in
§ 3617 retaliation cases illustrate this difference.
In Walker v. City of Lakewood,196 the Ninth Circuit adopted an
expansive view of “interferes with” in overturning summary
judgment against a fair housing organization that claimed the
defendant-city violated § 3617 by not renewing a contract with the
plaintiff in retaliation for the latter’s participation in a FHA suit.197
The Ninth Circuit first held that the plaintiff-organization (referred to
as “FHF”) was engaged in the § 3617-protected activity of “aiding or
encouraging” others in the exercise of their FHA rights.198 The court
then decided that the adverse action that FHF suffered as a result of
the defendant’s nonrenewal of its contract qualified as “interference”
under § 3617.199 The rationale for this conclusion included three
points: (1) that the Supreme Court has directed that the FHA’s
language should be broadly construed;200 (2) that the language used in

when the adverse employment action is only threatened, but not actually carried out).
195 In addition to Walker and Hayward, discussed infra notes 196–204 and accompanying
text and note 203, respectively, see, for example, Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp.
2d 602, 613–14 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that threat or use of force was not necessary to maintain
a claim); People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(same, but in summary-judgment context); People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond,
781 F. Supp. 1132, 1135–36 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same, but in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion);
cases cited supra notes 95–96 (same); see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18
F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Section 3617 is not limited to those who used some sort of
‘potent force or duress’ . . . .”).
196 272 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
197 Id. at 1128–31.
198 Id. at 1128.
199 Id. at 1128–30.
200 Id. at 1129 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). The
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§ 3617, in contrast to the related criminal provision in § 3631, does
not require “a showing of force or violence for coercion, interference,
intimidation, or threats to give rise to liability;”201 and (3) that, in
determining the “plain meaning” of the four triggering verbs in
§ 3617, dictionary definitions should be consulted, and such
definitions were broad enough to encompass the defendant’s
behavior.202 As for the third point, Walker quoted a prominent
dictionary from the time of the 1968 FHA that defined “interference”
as “the act of meddling in or hampering an activity or process.”203

Supreme Court’s conclusion in Trafficante that the FHA carries out a “policy that Congress
considered to be of the highest priority” and should be given “a generous construction,” 409
U.S. at 210–12, was reaffirmed in City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731
(1995). See also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290 (2003) (agreeing that the FHA’s objective
is an “overriding societal priority”); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982)
(noting the FHA’s “broad remedial intent”).
201 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128. For more on § 3631, see supra notes 36–37 and
accompanying text.
202 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128–29; see also People Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of
Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992) (providing broad interpretation of
interference under § 3617 based on view that its words “mean exactly what they say”); People
Helpers Found., Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp. 1132, 1135–36 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same).
Walker’s interpretive technique reflects the modern Supreme Court’s regular practice of
relying on definitions in dictionaries that were commonly used at the time of a law’s enactment
to help interpret words in civil rights and other statutes. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009) (interpreting Title VII); Burlington N.
& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (same); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1987) (interpreting the Civil Rights
Act of 1866). The theory is that Congress intends a statute’s words to bear their contemporary
common meaning. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (“[U]nless
otherwise defined [in the statute], words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence
of [a statutory] definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary and
natural meaning.” (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))); see also MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (relying, in choosing among
various dictionary definitions of the relevant term in a statute, primarily on those dictionaries
that were available at the time of the statute’s enactment).
203 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1129 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1178
(14th ed. 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Walker opinion also noted that a prior
Ninth Circuit opinion dealing with § 3617 had “explained that ‘interference,’ in particular, ‘has
been broadly applied to reach all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise
of rights under the federal fair housing laws. ’” Id. (quoting United States v. City of Hayward,
36 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1994)).
In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit upheld a § 3617 claim that accused the defendant-city of
ordering a mobile-home-park owner (Borello) to reduce rents under the city’s rent-control
ordinance following the park’s termination of its adults-only policy. Hayward held that the rent
reduction “interfered with” Borello on account of its having encouraged families with children
to live there. 36 F.3d at 835. After citing a number of § 3617 cases where “[c]ourts have found
various types of conduct to constitute ‘interference,’” id., the Hayward opinion rejected a
number of the defendant’s arguments opposing § 3617’s applicability to its rent-reduction order.
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Applying this definition to the facts at hand, the Ninth Circuit held
that FHF’s evidence “demonstrates that the City ‘interfered,’ or
meddled, with its ability to conduct its fair housing activities.”204
Walker also opined that the City’s conduct, “while certainly
interference, might also be considered coercion or threats.”205

Among these failed arguments was that
there was no “interference” because the [City]’s decision did not cause [Borello] to
change the park’s policies or practices. Section 3617 does not require one such as
Borello who is interfered with to capitulate to the interference. . . . In response to
terminating a discriminatory practice, the City penalized Borello by forcing Borello
to forego a portion of its income with no corresponding savings in costs. This alone
was sufficient as a matter of law to constitute interference.
Id. at 836.
In Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994), a
case that the Hayward court cited, the Sixth Circuit rejected various FHA claims against
neighbors by an organization whose efforts to operate a group home for disabled persons in their
area were frustrated when the neighbors bought the desired property at a higher price than the
organization had offered. Id. at 341–48. As for the § 3617 claim, the Sixth Circuit, though
recognizing this provision’s breadth as quoted above, id. at 347, did “not believe that the
neighbors’ act of purchasing the house constituted ‘interference’ within the meaning of the
FHAA,” id. at 348. The Babin opinion conceded that the neighbors’ actions may have
“interfered with” the plaintiff-organization’s ability to obtain the property, but “this interference
is not direct enough to warrant a finding of liability,” because “the neighbors’ actions did not
prevent [the plaintiff] from . . . continuing to bid for the property.” Id. Thus, Babin held that the
type of “interference” that takes the form merely of economic competition by third-party bidders
is not actionable under § 3617.
204 Walker, 272 F.3d at 1129. In support of this conclusion, Walker noted the following:
The City supervised the [FHF] more closely than it had before, by sending city
officials to monthly meetings, and also asked the FHF to “curtail the amount of
exposure” it gave discrimination complaints. Additionally, the City contacted other
cities to complain about the FHF and also filed suit against the FHF for breach of
contract, which required time and money to defend. Lastly, the City refused to renew
the FHF’s contract, which altogether prevented the organization from working in
Lakewood.
Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted) (citing Cal. Acrylic Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099
(9th Cir. 1998)). In justifying its citation to a NLRA case, the Walker court pointed out that
“[t]he similarity of the language of the two statutes is a strong indication that they should be
treated in the same manner.” Id. at 1130 n.7 (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 259 F.3d
1112 (9th Cir. 2001)). It might also be noted that § 3617’s legislative history shows that it was
designed to provide similar protection to that contained in the NLRA’s antiretaliation provision.
See supra note 133.
205 272 F.3d at 1130. The court also quoted extensively from the dictionary, noting:
To “coerce” is “to compel to an act or choice by force, threat, or other pressure.”
And, more relevant for this case, “coercion” includes “the application of sanctions or
force by a government [usually] accompanied by the suppression of constitutional
liberties in order to compel dissenters to conform.” Finally, a “threat” is “an
expression to inflict evil, injury, or other damage on another.”
Id. at 1129 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 439,
2382 (14th ed. 1961)). Among the evidence suggesting that the defendant’s behavior rose to the
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In contrast to Walker, a district court provided a narrow
interpretation of “interferes with” in Sporn v. Ocean Colony
Condominium Ass’n.206 The Sporn court awarded summary judgment
in favor of neighbors who had allegedly “shunned” the plaintiffs in
retaliation for the latter’s complaining about their condominium’s fair
housing violations.207 According to the court, such behavior was
simply not egregious enough to come within the concept of
interference under § 3617.208 Sporn based this conclusion in part on
its determination that prior § 3617 cases had involved more severe
treatment of the plaintiffs than “shunning” (Walker was not
mentioned)209 and on its own view that such serious behavior was the
only legitimate concern of § 3617.210
In holding that “shunning”-type actions “do not constitute
‘coercion, intimidation, threats or interference’ within the meaning of
§ 3617,”211 Sporn interpreted “interferes with” to reflect the severity
of the other three triggering verbs used in § 3617. This interpretive

level of coercion or a threat, the Ninth Circuit cited the following:
The City suggested it would not renew the contract if the FHF did not apologize
when Ebner [the City’s Director of Community Development] sent a letter stating
that “[t]he handling of The Park apartments case, and in particular the press
conference, leaves us with serious concerns for the future. . . .” Further evidence of
coercion is the letter from Ebner stating that payments would be withheld until the
organization apologized.
Id. at 1130 (second alteration and omission in original) (citing Lear Siegler Inc. v. NLRB, 890
F.2d 1573 (10th Cir. 1989)). However, Walker held that the defendant’s action could not be
considered “intimidation,” because this would “require a showing that the City’s activities had
generated fear in the FHF. There has been no such showing.” Id. at 1129 n.4 (citation omitted).
206 173 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.N.J. 2001).
207 Id. at 251. For more on the Sporn case, see supra note 99.
208 Id. at 251–52.
209 Id. at 252.
210 According to the Sporn court:
The Fair Housing Act is remedial legislation designed to address the very important
goal of providing accessibility to housing without regard to race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, national origin or disability. Consistent with this goal, the
prohibitions of § 3617 operate to ensure that situations that need to [be] remedied
can be brought to the attention of those with the power to effectuate the necessary
changes. Section 3617 does not, however, purport to impose a code of civility on
those dealing with individuals who have exercised their FHA rights. Simply put,
§ 3617 does not require that neighbors smile, say hello or hold the door for each
other. To hold otherwise would be to extend § 3617 to conduct it was never intended
to address and would have the effect of demeaning the aims of the Act and the
legitimate claims of plaintiffs who have been subjected to invidious and hurtful
discrimination and retaliation in the housing market.
Id. at 251–52 (citation omitted).
211 Id. at 251.
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technique is embodied in the canon noscitur a sociis (“a word is
known by the company it keeps”), which has been endorsed on
occasion by the Supreme Court,212 and has been used by at least two
other district courts to ascribe a narrow meaning to § 3617’s
“interferes with.”213 Other district courts have agreed that § 3617
212 See, e.g., Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486–87 (2006) (“‘[A] word is
known by the company it keeps’—a rule that ‘is often wisely applied to avoid the giving of
unintended breadth to the Act of Congress.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255 (2000)
(“[W]ords . . . are known by their companions.” (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
575 (1995); Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307)); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547
U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (“That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of
interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.” (quoting Beecham v. United
States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in a list should be given related
meaning.” (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (declining to
follow this canon where the phrase at issue “contains little ambiguity”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 840 (2008) (declining to follow this canon because “the overall
statutory context” suggests a different meaning).
213 In one, Housing Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Ala.
1999), the court rejected a § 3617 claim based on the defendants’ opposition to the plaintiffs’
proposal for an affordable housing development, and commented:

The words coerce, intimidate, and threaten are clearly words that suggest force,
violence, undue pressure, abuse of power, and measures intended to induce fear. The
conjunction or does imply that the final word, interfere, need not equate exactly with
the preceding words, but the context established by all of these words strung together
is that impermissible interference must be more than peaceable opposition through
legal channels.
Id. at 1301. However, in a later part of this opinion, the court was willing to assume, albeit in
dicta, that “one [bigoted] comment could constitute a § 3617 violation.” Id.
The second was Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (M.D.
Fla. 2003), vacated pursuant to settlement, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003). In
Gourley, the § 3617 claim was based on a homeowners’ association’s use of litigation and other
“interferences” techniques to prevent the plaintiff-couple from having foster children in their
home. Id. at 1225–27. The court determined that this claim hinged on the meaning of “interferes
with” in § 3617, because the other three verbs in this provision require “either violent conduct or
threatening conduct.” Id. at 1235. Although conceding that interference “could conceivably
extend broadly to any conduct that limits a protected persons [sic] use or enjoyment of a
dwelling,” id., the Gourley opinion held:
Under the canons of statutory construction, however, the general word interfere
should be interpreted in reference to and in context with the first three words of this
provision. This Court concludes that the use of the phrase “interference” in Section
3617 extends only to discriminatory conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it will
have the effect of causing a protected person to abandon the exercise of his or her
housing rights.
Id. Although this decision was ultimately vacated pursuant to a settlement, Gourlay’s tough
standard for interference claims under § 3617 was later endorsed by another district court in
Florida. See Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1145 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (declining to hold homeowners’ association liable under § 3617 for its failure to stop
neighbor’s harassment of black plaintiffs based on the court’s conclusion that “to constitute
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should be limited to severe behavior,214 with some concluding that the
same “severe or pervasive” standard that governs harassment claims
under § 3604(b) and Title VII is the proper measure of an interference
claim under § 3617.215
This goes too far. Whatever the proper standard for a § 3604(b)
“terms and conditions” harassment claim, the language and purpose
of that provision are distinctly different from those of § 3617. In an
analogous situation involving Title VII, the Supreme Court in 2006
held in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White216 that

actionable interference, in the absence of a violation of sections 3603–3606, the discriminatory
conduct must be pervasive and severe enough to be considered as threatening or violent” (citing
Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1236)).
214 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Pub. Hous. Agency, No. Civ.03-6096 PAM/RLE, 2004 WL
1212082, at *4–5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2004) (holding that the defendant’s negotiating demand
that the plaintiff give up some of her rights could have been refused and therefore “[t]here is no
allegation of undue coercion or intimidation that would rise to the level of a [§ 3617]
violation”); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (described supra
notes 100–03 and accompanying text); Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No. CIV.A 96-CV6486, 1998 WL 195693, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (holding that “some type of force or
compulsion” is required for a § 3617 violation); see also Wood v. Briarwinds Condo. Ass’n Bd.
of Dirs., 369 Fed. App’x 1, 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s § 3617
claim because his allegations—that the defendant had his van towed, assessed him fines, and
took photographs of him—“failed to allege conduct that rises to the level of coercion or
intimidation under the FHA”); East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 564
(7th Cir. 2005) (questioning, but not deciding, “whether the actions here were frequent and
severe enough to give rise to” a § 3617 claim).
215 See, e.g., Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (described supra note 213); see also East–
Miller, 421 F.3d at 564 (noting possible use of “severe and pervasive” standard); Groteboer v.
Eyota Econ. Dev. Auth., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 (D. Minn. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff
“must show severe and pervasive harassment”); Lawrence, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (using
“severe and pervasive” standard).
The “severe or pervasive” standard generally governs sex-based hostile-environment
claims both under the FHA’s § 3604(b), see cases cited supra note 113, and under Title VII’s
prohibition of discriminatory “terms, conditions, or privileges” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
see, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (“For any sexual
harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be
severe or pervasive.”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(labeling the “severe or pervasive” standard as “crucial” in sexual-harassment claims); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (applying the “severe or pervasive” standard to Title
VII claim); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that party
carries its burden of showing a hostile work environment by satisfying the “severe or pervasive”
standard); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–16 (2002) (noting
that “severe or pervasive” standard applies in race-based hostile-environment claim); cf.
Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 694, 717–19 (8th Cir. 2007) (Colloton, J., dissenting)
(noting that the “severe or pervasive” standard is used to evaluate employment-harassment cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and advocating use of this standard for evaluating § 1981
interference claims in the retail-shopping context).
216 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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that statute’s antiretaliation provision should be interpreted differently
from its key substantive provision.217 The Burlington Court noted:
The language of the substantive provision differs from that of
the antiretaliation provision in important ways. . . .
. . . [T]he question is whether Congress intended its
different words to make a legal difference. We normally
presume that, where words differ as they differ here,
“Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”218
The Burlington opinion also held that Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision served a distinct purpose from the statute’s substantive
provision. Thus:
[T]he two provisions differ not only in language but in
purpose as well. The antidiscrimination provision seeks a
workplace where individuals are not discriminated against
because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based
status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that
primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering
(through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The
substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals
based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what
they do, i.e., their conduct.
. . . [D]ifferences in the purpose of the two provisions . . .
justify this difference in interpretation.219
These differentiating factors are even more dramatic in the FHA.
The language of § 3617, unlike that of § 3604(b), does not even use
the term “discriminate” (as Title VII’s antiretaliation provision
217 Id. at 57 (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), is
not confined to “actions and harms . . . that are related to employment or occur at the
workplace,” i.e., those that only affect “the terms and conditions of employment”); see also
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1960–61 (2008) (affirming that Burlington
held that “Title VII’s antiretaliation provision . . . had a broader reach than the statute’s
substantive provision”).
218 548 U.S. at 61–63 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
219 Id. at 63, 67 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973)).
“Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the antiretaliation
provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect
the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 64 (citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt,
546 U.S. 303, 319 (2006)).
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does),220 and § 3617’s purposes go well beyond merely outlawing
retaliation for participating in FHA proceedings.221 Furthermore, the
distinction between § 3617 and § 3604(b) is also supported by the
HUD regulation that interprets § 3617 to outlaw interfering with
persons in the “enjoyment” of their home,222 a much broader concept
than HUD’s interpretation of harassing behavior that runs afoul of
§ 3604(b).223
Thus, it seems clear that district court decisions limiting § 3617
interference claims to behavior that is “severe or pervasive” enough
to violate a resident’s rights under § 3604(b)224 are too restrictive.
And the same is true for those decisions that would restrict neighbor
harassment claims to conduct that is “designed to drive the individual
out of his or her home.”225 Section 3617 may well cover these
situations, but it goes farther.
One limit on how much farther is suggested by the second part of
the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Burlington case, which held that
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers “those (and only those)
employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant.”226 Thus, according to the
Burlington opinion, this provision in Title VII “protects an individual

220 Compare supra text accompanying note 34 (quoting § 3604(b)), with supra text
accompanying note 29 (quoting § 3617). Title VII’s antiretaliation provision “prohibits an
employer from ‘discriminat[ing] against’ an employee or job applicant because that individual
‘opposed any practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in’ a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 56 (alteration in
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
221 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 176, 182–85 and accompanying text.
Two civil rights statutes passed in the 1990s use language in their antiretaliation
provisions that is more similar to § 3617 than to Title VII. See Family Medical Leave Act of
1993 § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter.”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2006)
(providing an antiharassment provision that is virtually identical in its operative language to
§ 3617). Both of these provisions have produced substantial litigation, but rarely have the cases
provided any useful insight into the meaning of the terms (e.g., “interfere”) that are used in
§ 3617 but not Title VII. See, e.g., Wray v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
1040 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (noting in dicta in ADA case that the defendant’s actions may have been
“unpleasant and intimidating” and therefore sufficiently negative to come within the operative
verbs in § 12203(b)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.400–.404 (2010) (providing regulations for
enforcement of the Family Medical Leave Act that do not define “interfere” for purposes of
§ 2615(a)(1)).
222 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010).
223 See id. §§ 100.65, 100.70(b) (describing and providing examples of conduct that
violates § 3604(b)).
224 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 215.
225 Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
226 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
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not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or
harm.”227 Furthermore:
We speak of material adversity because we believe it is
important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII,
we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for
the American workplace.” An employee’s decision to report
discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from
those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place
at work and that all employees experience. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent employer interference with
“unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms. It
does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely “to
deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the
EEOC,” the courts, and their employers. And normally petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners
will not create such deterrence.228
The Court in Burlington emphasized that the “standard for judging
harm must be objective,” i.e., how “a reasonable employee” would
react to the defendant’s behavior.229 Finally, Burlington determined
that “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend
upon the particular circumstances. Context matters. . . . [A]n ‘act that
would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.’”230
The basic standards set forth in Burlington should control future
interference claims under § 3617.231 Burlington regularly uses
227 Id.

at 67.
at 68 (citations omitted). Among the examples of nonactionable behavior that this
passage in Burlington identified were “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the
sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing,” id. (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
and “‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing by supervisors and
co-workers,’” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 B. LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 669 (3d ed. 1996)).
229 Id. at 68. Thus, Burlington held, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’” Id. (internal quotatin marks omitted) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). According to Burlington: “An objective standard is judicially
administrable[ and . . .] avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a
judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Id. at 68–69.
230 Id. at 69 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.
2005)).
231 In addition to the reasons given in the text, this proposition is supported by the courts’
general tendency to rely on Title VII precedents to interpret the FHA. See SCHWEMM, supra
note 28, § 7:4 & nn.3–4 (stating that “[a] number of lower courts have followed this lead by
relying on Title VII precedents to interpret [the FHA]” and citing numerous cases in support).
228 Id.

1/14/2011 1:31:54 AM

46

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3

“interfering with” and “interference”—the key concept involved in
most § 3617 claims—to describe the behavior being regulated.232
Furthermore, Burlington, although recognizing that Title VII’s
retaliation provision is distinct from its substantive provision, insisted
that the former should reflect concerns derived from decisions
interpreting the latter in avoiding turning the statute into “a general
civility code.”233 The same must now presumably obtain in FHA
cases. In summary, Burlington suggests that “interferes with” under
§ 3617 should be interpreted to require that “a reasonable person” in
the context of the plaintiff’s particular situation would find the
challenged behavior so “materially adverse” that he would be deterred
from exercising or enjoying his FHA rights.234
Burlington’s key lesson, of course, is that § 3617 should be
interpreted based on its own language and purpose apart from the
FHA’s other substantive provisions. The problem, however, is that
§ 3617, unlike its Title VII counterpart, explicitly refers to the rights
“granted or protected” by these other substantive provisions. Thus, a
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment case must not only involve
behavior that would be materially adverse to a reasonable plaintiff,
but would dissuade that person from exercising or enjoying the rights
granted or protected by §§ 3603–3606. The next subsection examines
what, exactly, these rights are.
3. The Relationship of § 3617 to the Rights
Protected by §§ 3603–3606
The problem here is to determine whether, if a neighbor’s conduct
is sufficiently egregious to constitute interference for purposes of
§ 3617, that conduct affects the “exercise or enjoyment” of a “right
granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606. As noted above, courts have
struggled throughout the FHA’s history to define the proper

232 See

supra text accompanying notes 219, 228 (quoting Burlington).
supra text accompanying note 228 (quoting Burlington).
supra note 229 (quoting Burlington); cf. United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777,
782–83 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining, for purposes of § 3631 prosecution, that whether the
defendants’ behavior constituted a threat involves an evaluation of the context and of how a
reasonable person targeted by such behavior would feel); SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 15:3 n.4,
§ 15:6 nn.19–22, § 15:8 & n.2 (citing cases holding that, for purposes of the FHA’s prohibition
against discriminatory ads and statements in § 3604(c), the challenged ad or statement should be
judged by an “ordinary reader” or “ordinary listener” standard); id. § 17:2 & n.1 (citing cases
holding that, in order to violate the FHA’s prohibition against “blockbusting” in § 3604(e), a
challenged statement must, “under the circumstances, . . . convey to a reasonable person” the
illegal message).
233 See
234 See
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relationship between a § 3617 claim and the rights recognized in the
provisions it refers to.235
One of the few pre-Halprin appellate decisions to deal with this
issue was produced by the Second Circuit in 1994 in Frazier v.
Rominger.236 The Frazier opinion began its § 3617 analysis by noting
that this provision “prohibits the interference with the exercise of Fair
Housing rights only as enumerated in these referenced sections.”237
The main plaintiffs in this case were a mixed-race couple who were
rejected for an apartment after they asked the landlord (Rominger)
whether his hesitancy about renting to them was “a racial thing.”238
Rominger testified at trial that he decided not to rent to the couple
because “being accused of race discrimination made him feel very
uncomfortable, and . . . he considered it important to feel comfortable
with his tenants.”239 The jury apparently believed this testimony and
ruled against the plaintiffs on their refusal-to-rent claim under
§ 3604(a),240 a ruling that was upheld on appeal.241
The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim.242 It
held they could not “claim that Mr. Frazier’s questioning of Mr.
235 See

supra Part III.D.1.
F.3d 828 (2d Cir. 1994).
237 Id. at 834.
238 Id. at 829–30. Besides the couple (a black man named Eddie Frazier and a white
woman named Diane Treloar), the Frazier plaintiffs included a fair housing organization that
had tested the case for them. Id. at 829, 831. After Rominger showed Frazier and Treloar the
apartment, they said they would like to rent it, but Rominger told them they needed to submit an
application and that he preferred to rent to a single tenant. Id. at 829–30. Frazier then questioned
Rominger about his hesitancy to rent to the couple and asked Rominger, in what Rominger
perceived as an angry tone, “Is this a racial thing?” Id. at 830. Rominger replied that it was not
and that everyone had to fill out an application; he then provided an application form, which the
plaintiffs completed before leaving. Id. By then, however, Rominger had apparently decided not
to the rent to the couple because of “being accused of race discrimination.” Id. at 831.
Thereafter, Rominger rented the apartment to a white couple for a brief period and then to a
single Hispanic woman. Id.
239 Id. at 831.
240 Id.
241 On the § 3604(a) claim, the Second Circuit held that, although the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the defendant’s
236 27

proffered justification for denying the couple the apartment—Mr. Frazier’s question
as to whether the perceived hesitancy was “a racial thing” and the discomfort this
question engendered on Mr. Rominger’s part—was . . . a legally acceptable
explanation for denying Mr. Frazier and Ms. Treloar the apartment which the jury
was free to accept or reject.
Id. at 831–32.
242 Id. at 833–34. The plaintiffs had not originally pled a § 3617 claim, but at trial they
moved to have the jury instructed on § 3617 as well as § 3604(a), which the trial court refused
to do. Id. at 831. In their appeal, the plaintiffs challenged both their § 3604(a) loss and their
inability to proceed under § 3617. Id. at 831, 833.
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Rominger’s potential bias constituted the ‘exercise or enjoyment of’
one of his rights under the Fair Housing Act.”243 In other words,
Frazier held that a minority homeseeker’s “right” to question a
housing provider’s motivation as racial is not a “right granted or
protected” by §§ 3603–3606. Those sections, according to the Second
Circuit, “provide that prospective tenants have a right not to be
discriminated against on account of their race in a wide variety of
housing transactions.”244 However, “[n]owhere in these sections . . .
can be found a right to question the potential racial motivations of
landlords.”245 Thus, Frazier concluded, the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim
failed because it was “without a predicate.”246
The Frazier court saw an additional problem with the plaintiffs’
§ 3617 claim, based on the fact that “the only ‘interference’ that
plaintiffs can claim is the actual denial of rental housing,” which they
alleged violated § 3604(a).247 The Second Circuit concluded that a
§ 3617 “interference” claim could not be based solely on the same
conduct that was concurrently being challenged under § 3604(a),
believing that Congress never intended “such a statutory overlap” and
thus “that the plaintiffs’ sole remedy in this case existed in their
§ 3604(a) cause of action.”248 Based on this analysis, Frazier held that
243 Id.
244 Id.

at 833.
at 834.

245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. Thus, as the Second Circuit saw it, the theory underlying the plaintiffs’ § 3617 claim
was that the defendants’ refusal to rent to them “is at the same time a § 3604(a) discrimination
and a § 3617 interference, thus giving rise to two separate causes of action.” Id. at 833. The
Frazier opinion described this theory as “somewhat peculiar,” id., because “under this theory,
every allegedly discriminatory denial of housing under § 3604(a) would also constitute a
violation of § 3617 in that the denial ‘interfered’ with the prospective tenant’s Fair Housing Act
rights,” id. at 834.
248 Id. at 834. As noted above, the Seventh Circuit disagrees, having concluded in both
Bloch and Halprin that the same conduct may well result in a § 3617 violation as well as a
§ 3604 violation. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 328–29 (7th Cir. 2004);
see also Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1997) (described supra note 113);
infra note 249 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the Arlington Heights case). Other
appellate courts agree with the Seventh Circuit on this point. See, e.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598
F.3d 938, 946–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (described supra note 113); Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (considering claims of §§ 3604 and
3617 violations); HUD ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 1990)
(affirming ALJ’s finding of a violation of §§ 3604 and 3617); appellate cases cited supra note
178; see also United States v. Collier, No. 08-0686, 2010 WL 3881381, at *9–11 (W.D. La.
Sept. 28, 2010) (finding violations of § 3617 along with § 3604(a)–(c) at urging of the Justice
Department). Indeed, as the Bloch opinion pointed out, there is nothing unusual in concluding
that particular conduct may violate more than one FHA provision. See Bloch, 597 F.3d at 782;
see also SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 11C:2 n.36, § 13:15 n.4, § 14:2 n.18, § 14:3 & n.30 (citing
cases holding that same conduct violates multiple sections of the FHA). See generally CBOCS
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“the plaintiffs did not state a cause of action under § 3617 separate
and distinct from their cause of action under § 3604(a).”249
This part of the Frazier analysis also implies, however, that a
§ 3617 interference claim may well be viable without a violation of
§§ 3603–3606 in a different type of case. If, as Frazier contends, no
such § 3617 claim is available when the conduct complained of is
unsuccessfully challenged under § 3604(a),250 the reverse corollary is
that § 3617 may apply in situations where the complained of conduct
does not violate §§ 3603–3606.251
Thus, as one district court within the Second Circuit later noted in
a neighbor-on-neighbor harassment case, Frazier certainly does not
bar this type of § 3617 claim.252 Indeed, as we have seen, in most
cases involving neighbor harassment, the plaintiff would not have a
claim under §§ 3603–3606 to begin with.253
But the question remains what § 3617 means when it refers to
exercising or enjoying “any right granted or protected by” §§ 3603–

W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2008) (describing how civil rights statutes should
be interpreted to overlap where “the ‘overlap’ reflects congressional design”).
In light of this overwhelming authority to the contrary, the Second Circuit’s statement
quoted in the text must be considered misguided dicta. It is true that many courts, including the
Seventh Circuit, have rejected a § 3617 claim after ruling against the plaintiff’s § 3604 claim
based on the same conduct with only a brief analysis of the § 3617 claim. See supra note 178
and accompanying text (citing cases). The Frazier court could have followed this technique.
The fact that it chose to articulate a different approach was unfortunate, but only to the extent
that the statement quoted in the text might be mistaken as correct.
249 27 F.3d at 834. Frazier’s conclusion here that the same conduct cannot produce a
§ 3617 interference claim separate from a claim under § 3604(a) is somewhat reminiscent of the
Seventh Circuit’s determination in 1977 that, when the same conduct is alleged to have violated
both § 3604(a) and § 3617, “the validity of the section 3617 claim depends on whether [that
conduct] violated section 3604(a).” Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (cited supra notes 177 and 179). In these circumstances, the
Seventh Circuit would apparently hold that a violation of § 3604(a) means that § 3617 is also
violated, whereas Frazier held that no § 3617 claim can be asserted in such a situation, but the
practical result is the same: that is, the § 3617 claim provides no additional value for potential
plaintiffs. This is at least true for cases in the modern era after the 1988 FHAA made § 3617
claims subject to the same statutes of limitations and other enforcement procedures that govern
§ 3604 claims. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the FHAA); supra note
182 (citing pre-FHAA cases dealing with enforcement of § 3617).
250 But see supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
251 This view is consistent with the many decisions, both before and after Frazier, holding
that § 3617 can, in some circumstances, produce a viable claim without a violation of §§ 3603–
3606. See cases cited supra notes 180 and 191.
252 See Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(concluding, with respect to the proposition that § 3617 can “serve as a separate basis for an
FHA claim where there is no predicate for liability under [§§ 3603–3606],” that “a careful
reading of Frazier suggests that the Second Circuit agrees”). For further discussion of Ohana,
see supra note 98; infra notes 260–66 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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3606; that is, what are the “predicate” rights under these provisions
that Frazier held are required for a § 3617 claim. On this point,
Frazier tells us only what such rights do not include (i.e., they do not
include questioning a landlord about his potential bias).254
Prior cases do suggest some affirmative answers. One example is
Judge Posner’s hypothetical in Halprin of a neighbor burning down a
minority’s house, which Bloch later agreed would constitute a
violation of both §§ 3604(a) and 3617.255 Furthermore, even if the
harassment is not so egregious as to constitute a § 3604 violation, the
victim may still have a § 3617 claim, for, as Bloch pointed out, the
fact that “§ 3604 prohibits discriminatory evictions[ means] that
attempted discriminatory evictions can violate § 3617’s prohibition
against interference with § 3604 rights.”256
Beyond avoiding arson and attempted eviction, what other “rights”
do minority residents have under § 3617? In addressing this question,
it is worth remembering that § 3617 refers to rights that are “granted
or protected” by §§ 3603–3606,257 and that the addition of the “or
protected” phrase was one of the few changes made to § 3617’s
substantive language during the FHA’s legislative history.258
Furthermore, some courts have focused on the fact that the language
of § 3617 protects not only the “exercise” but also the “enjoyment” of
§§ 3603–3606 rights.259 For example, in Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place
Realty Corp.,260 the court upheld the plaintiffs’§ 3617 claim based on
neighbor harassment, concluding that the plaintiffs, “having already
exercised their rights to fair housing” by moving into their home, had
“a cognizable claim under § 3617” to avoid interference with “the
enjoyment of these rights because of [their] race, religion and national
254 See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. For another example of an appellate
court’s determination of what §§ 3603–3606 rights do not include for purposes of § 3617, see
Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that, because the plaintiffs
have no right under § 3604(b) “to hang religious artwork in Hallmark’s rental office, which is
separate from their personal dwelling,” their § 3617 “claim for retaliatory housing
discrimination” cannot be based on § 3604(b) and therefore “must fail”).
255 See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329
(7th Cir. 2004) (posing hypothetical); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 776–77, 781–82 (7th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (agreeing with Halprin that “§ 3604(a) may reach post-acquisition
discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant,” and implying
that a physical deprivation of one’s dwelling violating § 3604(a) also violates § 3617); see also
Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783 (holding that the plaintiffs there had a § 3617 claim if they were
interfered with in “the . . . exercise or enjoyment of their right to inhabit their condo”).
256 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782.
257 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006) (emphasis added).
258 See supra notes 120, 123 (summarizing the substantive changes made to § 3617).
259 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
260 996 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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origin.”261 In addition, a number of sex harassment cases have upheld
§ 3617 claims based on the determination that the defendant’s
behavior interfered with the complainant’s enjoyment of her home.262
In upholding these interference-with-enjoyment claims, Ohana and
some other opinions relied on—and gave Chevron deference to—
261 Id. at 243; see also Antonio v. Sec. Servs. of Am., LLC, 701 F. Supp. 2d 749, 772 (D.
Md. 2010) (citing § 3617 in support of the conclusion that the Fair Housing Act guarantees
“persons basic rights to be free from discrimination in connection with their enjoyment of
property”); United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (“Several
cases have affirmed the existence of a cause of action under § 3617, for discriminatory
interference with enjoyment of occupancy . . . .”); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173,
177–78 (D.P.R. 1995) (noting, in the course of upholding various FHA claims, that the plaintiffresident had “the continuing right to quiet enjoyment and use of her condominium unit and
common areas of the building” and that § 3617 bars interference with an “individual’s free
exercise of [such] housing rights”); HUD v. Courthouse Square Co., Fair Housing–Fair Lending
Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,155, at 26,247 (HUD ALJ 2001), available at 2001 WL 953792
(holding, for purposes of § 3617, that it follows from the fact that an individual has “exercised
her rights under the [FHA] by taking up residence in” respondents’ housing that “her continued
enjoyment of her tenancy would be deemed an exercise of her rights under the [FHA]”); HUD
v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, at 25,726–27 (HUD
ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (holding that respondent-neighbor’s racial slurs
directed at black family violated § 3617 because they “interfered with Complainants’ exercise of
that right, i.e., a quiet enjoyment of their apartment, because of Complainants’ race” and
“interfered with their ability to reside there free from such menace. . . . [and the] right to enjoy
[their] home free from such slurs”), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. &
Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994).
262 E.g., Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that landlord’s
“numerous unwanted interactions of a sexual nature . . . interfered with [the plaintiff’s] use and
enjoyment of her home” and violated § 3617 because they interfered with the plaintiff’s
“enjoyment of her housing rights”); United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–80 (D.
Neb. 2004) (holding that § 3617 is violated by landlord’s unwelcome sexual advances to female
tenants that interfered with their “enjoyment of a dwelling because of [their] sex”); HUD v.
Krueger, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rptr. ¶ 25,119, at 26,026 (HUD ALJ 1996), available at
1996 WL 418886 (holding that landlord’s sexual harassment of female tenant violated § 3617
because it interfered with “her exercise of the right she was attempting to enjoy,” i.e., “she was
attempting to enjoy a right protected under the Act—quiet enjoyment of her apartment without
interference from sexual harassment”), aff’d sub nom. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th
Cir. 1997); HUD v. Kogut, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rptr. ¶ 25,100, at 25,904 (HUD ALJ
1995), available at 1995 WL 225277 (holding that landlord’s eviction of tenant who refused his
sexual advances violated § 3617 because “she was attempting to enjoy housing free from
interference because of discrimination; that is, she was exercising her right to quiet enjoyment
of her apartment”). In the Koch case, the court opined:

[I]f a woman rents an apartment-ostensibly pursuant to the same lease terms that are
provided to all other tenants-it seems to me that she has exercised her rights to obtain
a dwelling without discrimination on account of her sex. This right is protected by
section 3604, although there has been no violation of this right. If, however, after she
has taken possession of the property, she is then subjected to discriminatory acts
based upon her sex, it seems to me that she should be allowed to prove that she
experienced [a § 3617 violation through] interference-if not threats, intimidation, or
coercion-on account of her having exercised or enjoyed her right of access to
housing protected by section 3604.
352 F. Supp. 2d at 978–79 n.8.
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HUD’s § 3617 regulation,263 which outlaws “interfering with persons
in their enjoyment of a dwelling” because of such persons’ race or
other factor prohibited by the FHA.264 The Ohana opinion, in
particular, emphasized that this made it appropriate to interpret
§ 3617 to cover “actions that would interfere with the enjoyment of a
person’s property” or that interfere with the “peaceful enjoyment of
one’s home.”265 The latter concept, according to Ohana,
is obviously sufficiently pervasive to embrace the expectation
that one should be able to live in racial and ethnic harmony
with one’s neighbors. This case is not about providing a
federal judicial forum for the resolution of disputes amongst
neighbors. It is simply about holding one accountable for
intentionally intruding upon the quietude of another’s home
because of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial
status or national origin. The Fair Housing Act . . . is an
appropriate means for accomplishing this salutary end . . . .266
Thus, the conclusion suggested by Ohana and the HUD
regulations is that § 3617 may be invoked in any case where the
challenged conduct interferes with the plaintiff’s “right” to enjoy his
or her home free from invidiously motivated harassment, i.e., that
such a right is “granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606.267 This would
263 E.g., Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 979–80; Ohana, 996 F. Supp. at 242. For more on the
meaning of Chevron deference, see supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
In Bloch, the Seventh Circuit gave HUD’s interpretation in this regulation “great weight,”
Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)), but not full Chevron deference, id. (citing Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50 (1990)). In Adams Fruit, the Supreme Court refused
to defer to a Department of Labor regulation, holding that a precondition for Chevron deference,
i.e., that the statute contain a delegation of administrative authority to the agency, did not exist
here, because the Department of Labor was given authority only to promulgate substantive
standards and not also to define the extent of private rights of action, which remained the
province of the judiciary. 494 U.S. at 649–50. Unlike Adams Fruit, however, the issue here is
how the FHA’s substantive provisions should be interpreted. As to this, the FHA does delegate
administrative authority to HUD. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the FHA
grant of authority to HUD); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003) (citing
Chevron in support of deferring to a HUD regulation interpreting the FHA). Thus, Bloch should
have given full Chevron deference to HUD’s § 3617 regulation, as Ohana and other courts have
done.
264 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010).
265 996 F. Supp. at 241, 243.
266 Id. at 243 (citing United States v. Weisz, 914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054–55 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
267 For a further description of these provisions, see supra notes 31–33 and accompanying
text. In neighbor harassment cases, it would seem particularly appropriate to attribute this right
as being protected by § 3604(b), which outlaws discrimination in the privileges, terms, and
conditions of the sale or rental of a dwelling.

1/14/2011 1:31:54 AM

2011]

NEIGHBOR-ON-NEIGHBOR HARASSMENT

53

mean, as least in theory, that any race-based abusive remark by a
neighbor might suffice to trigger a § 3617 claim. If, as suggested in
the previous Section, however, the Title VII standards from
Burlington apply, then the neighbor’s behavior would have to be
sufficiently egregious that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position would consider the behavior to have a materially adverse
effect on the enjoyment of one’s home.268 But this is a far more
generous standard than that advocated in some earlier neighbor
harassment cases (e.g., that such harassment would be actionable only
if it were designed to oust the plaintiffs from their home). 269 And it is
a significantly different standard than Bloch’s “pattern of harassment”
requirement.270 Instead, the key would be how a reasonable minority
homeowner or tenant would respond to the defendant’s behavior; thus
liability could result, in a given context and contrary to Bloch, from
an “isolated act of discrimination.”271
The incident(s) must, however, be “invidiously motivated.” The
right being recognized for purposes of § 3617 is not peaceful
enjoyment generally, but a particular kind of peaceful enjoyment, i.e.,
that undisturbed by racial or other FHA-condemned types of
harassment. Thus, Bloch and other courts have been correct in
identifying the necessary elements for such a § 3617 claim as
including the defendant’s being “motivated by an intent to
discriminate,”272 even though this element is not required in certain
other types of § 3617 claims.273 This means, for example, that the
Weisz court’s rejection of a neighbor harassment claim was sound, at
least to the extent the court there accurately attributed the defendant’s
268 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text (discussing the Burlington “materially
adverse to a reasonable employee” standard).
269 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Egan v. Schmock).
270 Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
271 Id. (quoting Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330) (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 Id. (citing East–Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.2d 558, 563 (7th Cir.
2005)); see also Simoes v. Wintermere Pointe Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-01384LSC, 2009 WL 2216781, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2009) (awarding summary judgment against
Brazilian resident’s § 3617 claim on the ground that he failed to show that the defendant’s
actions were prompted by “Latin American animus” or “animus toward Brazilians”), aff’d, 375
Fed. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2010).
273 For example, in retaliation claims under § 3617, the required elements are that: (1) the
plaintiff was engaged in an activity protected by §§ 3603–3606; (2) the defendant took some
adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected
activity and the adverse action. See SCHWEMM, supra note 28, § 20:5, at 20-27 n.3 (citing
cases). But see Campbell v. Robb, 162 Fed. App’x 460, 472–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (requiring,
based on prior circuit precedent, a showing of discriminatory animus in § 3617 retaliation
claim).
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behavior solely to hostility to her neighbors that was not based on
their religion.274
Given the FHA’s goal of fostering integration,275 it seems obvious
that § 3617 should cover invidiously motivated harassment that
discourages minorities from moving into white areas276 or, once there,
makes them feel so unwelcome that they decide to move away.277 But
§ 3617 goes beyond those situations where a change of residence
occurs.278 Interference under § 3617 should be interpreted to include
any neighbor harassment that would reduce a reasonable person’s
enjoyment of his home sufficiently to raise the prospect of having to
move.
274 See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (summarizing the Weisz holding and
rationale).
275 See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
276 See, e.g., HUD v. Weber, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,041,
at 25,424 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993 WL 246392 (noting that minority who was
inspecting a rental unit when local resident verbally harassed him did not rent this unit, but is
protected by § 3617 because he had “a right to attempt to rent a home without being subjected to
discrimination”); cf. United States v. Craft, 484 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
convictions under § 3631 may be based on behavior directed at minorities before they
“physically reside in the property” (citing United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.
1986); United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1977))).
277 See, e.g., HUD v. Lashley, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.)
¶ 25,039, at 25,405 (HUD ALJ 1992), available at 1992 WL 406539 (noting that victims moved
as a result of neighbor harassment that was held to violate § 3617); HUD v. Johnson, Fair
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,076, at 25,705 (HUD ALJ 1994), available
at 1994 WL 391135 (same).
278 See Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610–611, 613–14 (D.N.J.
2000) (upholding § 3617 claim where the defendants’ alleged harassment was unsuccessful in
driving the plaintiffs from their home); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D.P.R.
1995) (same); supra notes 63, 259–68 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ understanding
that the reach of § 3617 extends beyond circumstances in which physical vacation of the
property results); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, in
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for making racist threats regarding a black family
about to move into the defendant’s neighborhood, that the family “nevertheless decided to go
through with the purchase of the home, but they kept strict watch over their children so as to
protect them from possible attacks or mischief from their neighbors”); United States v.
Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1252–53 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that § 3631 conviction does not
require that the target of the defendant’s behavior leave their home); United States v. Wood, 780
F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). In the Wood case, the Eleventh Circuit wrote, in the
course of upholding a § 3631 conviction:

Section 3631 was clearly designed to protect an individual’s right to occupy a
dwelling of one’s choice free from racial pressure. . . . The statute prohibits acts of
willful intimidation of or interference with a victim “because of his race . . . and
because he is . . . occupying . . . any dwelling.” Section 3631 nowhere mentions that
the acts be designed to force an individual to move; it merely requires that the acts be
precipitated by the individual’s occupation of a particular house. “Occupation”
includes more than mere physical presence within four walls; the term clearly
incorporates the right to associate in one’s home with members of another race.
Id. (second, third, and fourth omissions in original).
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While predicting how a reasonable person would react to a
particular incident or type of housing harassment may be difficult,279
it seems likely that most Americans would find a challenge to their
right to live in their chosen home an extremely stressful situation.280
Furthermore, because many of these cases involve minority
families who have recently moved into predominantly white areas, it
would be reasonable for them to be somewhat on their guard and to
react negatively to race-based abuse that interferes with the peaceful
enjoyment of their home.281
In summary, the conclusion seems inescapable that even one
invidiously motivated incident or abusive remark by a hostile
neighbor might well result in liability under § 3617. This was, in fact,
the holding in an early HUD administrative decision rendered shortly
after the 1988 FHAA reenacted § 3617,282 and it is a conclusion that
279 But certainly not outside the range of judicial competence. See supra note 229 and
accompanying text (discussing the Burlington court’s use of a reasonable-person analysis in the
employment-discrimination context); see also Short, supra note 47, at 211 n.53 (arguing that the
“concern over potentially federalizing common, ordinary neighbor-to-neighbor disputes . . .
ignores the ability of judges to draw appropriate lines in hard cases”).
280 See, e.g., Regina Cohen, Comment, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual
Harassment in Housing, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1073–74 (1987) (describing typical reactions
of housing-harassment victims to include feelings of nervousness, frustration, fear, and anger,
which can manifest themselves in physical illness, decreased work productivity, and
depression); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for
Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 820–29
(2008) (discussing the importance of security of tenure as an element of the human right to
housing); Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under
the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 786–88 (2002)
(citing sources dealing with the negative effects of sex harassment in housing); cf. Homesavers
Council of Greenfield Gardens, Inc. v. Sanchez, 874 N.E.2d 497, 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(finding it foreseeable that tenant would suffer emotional distress as a result of landlord’s
interference with her quiet enjoyment).
281 See, e.g., HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.)
¶ 25,078, at 25,726–27 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (describing, in holding
that respondent-neighbor’s racial slurs violated § 3617, how various members of the target
family were negatively affected by these comments, including the children suffering fear and
nightmares), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ
1994); cf. United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 616 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, in
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for making racist threats regarding a black family
about to move into the defendant’s neighborhood, that the target of these threats “justifiably felt
compelled to take special precautions to ensure the well-being of their family members,” which
included altering their lifestyles, limiting their children’s activities, and rearranging the furniture
“so it wasn’t in front of the window. . . . to be sure if a brick or gunshots or something that came
into the window, it wouldn’t hit anybody,” and that the defendant “was, or should have been,
aware that such defensive actions were but natural reactions flowing from [his threatening]
comments”); United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1314–16 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting, in
upholding the defendant’s § 3631 conviction for burning a cross in the yard of an interracial
family, that the family thereafter took extensive security measures that included having their
eleven-year-old son carry and sleep with a baseball bat for protection).
282 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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seems justified by the statute’s text, purpose, and legislative history.
The next Section examines whether this interpretation is foreclosed
by First Amendment considerations.
E. First Amendment Considerations
1. Overview
Defendants accused of violating § 3617 based on their speech or
other expressive activities have often argued that they are protected
from liability by the First Amendment. 283 Actually, First Amendment
arguments have been made in two distinct types of § 3617 cases:
(1) those where the defendants have opposed a housing project
through litigation and/or comments to a local zoning board or similar
governmental entity; and (2) those where the defendant-neighbors’
harassment has taken the form of verbal abuse or other type of
communication directed at minority residents.284 Defendants in the
former type of case clearly do have some First Amendment
protection, at least so long as their litigation or petitioning behavior
has a good-faith basis and is not solely motivated by a discriminatory
factor condemned by the FHA.285
283 See,

e.g., cases cited infra notes 285–87.
occasion, both situations may be present in the same case. See, e.g., Simoes v.
Wintermere Pointe Homeowners Ass’n, No. 6:08-CV-01384-LSC, 2009 WL 2216781, at *6–8
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2009) (rejecting, for lack of proof of discriminatory animus, Brazilian
resident’s § 3617 claim based on a variety of hostile actions by homeowners’ association that
included state court litigation), aff’d, 375 Fed. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2010); Scialabba v. Sierra
Blanca Condo. No. One Ass’n, No. 00 C 5344, 2000 WL 1889664, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27,
2000) (upholding § 3617 claim on behalf of mentally disabled condominium resident based on
the defendants’ allegedly having “imposed discriminatory conditions upon [his] use of
condominium facilities” and filed “a lawsuit to enforce liens imposed for discriminatory
purposes”); Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D.P.R. 1995) (upholding § 3617
claim by mentally disabled condominium resident who alleged that she had been the target of a
series of intimidating actions by the condominium’s management and some of her neighbors,
including groundless civil lawsuits, threats of criminal complaints, and unauthorized searches of
her unit).
285 For examples of cases that have upheld First Amendment claims in this situation, see
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1230–37 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Robinson, Fair
Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 15,979 (D. Conn. 1995); HUD v. Grappone,
Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. ¶ 25,059, at 25,574–79 (HUD ALJ 1993), available at 1993
WL 388605; see also New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2007)
(suggesting that the defendant’s First Amendment rights to speak and petition might shield it
from FHA liability for its having filed a state court condemnation proceeding against the
plaintiff’s apartment complex and its lobbying HUD not to renew the complex’s funding);
Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2006)
(awarding attorney’s fees to the defendants who prevailed in a suit accusing them of unlawfully
interfering with a housing developer by opposing its proposal before the city council, after
noting that an individual’s First Amendment right to publically oppose a proposed housing
development had been established since the early 1990s); Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of
284 On
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As for neighbor harassment cases, no court has yet held that an
otherwise unlawful communication under § 3617 is protected by the
First Amendment.286 Some opinions, however, have recognized First
Amendment concerns and have accordingly interpreted § 3617
narrowly to steer clear of barring protected expression,287 an approach
that has also been followed in other types of FHA cases. 288 This

Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (described infra note 287).
Other cases have rejected First Amendment claims in this situation. See, e.g., United States
v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp. 972, 980–83 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that First Amendment
protection did not apply because the defendant filed suit with an objectively baseless claim and
with improper motive); Tizes v. Curcio, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.)
¶ 16,021, at 16,021.2–.3 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that the defendants’ lawsuit against the
plaintiffs was not protected by the First Amendment because there is no protection when one
uses administrative or judicial proceedings for fraudulent or unlawful purposes); see also United
States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562–63 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding § 3617 violation based on
the defendants’ efforts to block housing for disabled persons, which included filing a lawsuit,
without discussing First Amendment issues). See generally Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (holding that baseless litigation is not protected by the First
Amendment’s right to petition).
286 See, e.g., LeBlanc–Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 265–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect defendants against § 3617 claim based on
their efforts to harass and discourage Orthodox Jews from living in the defendants’ town); HUD
v. Simpson, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,082, at 25,761 (HUD ALJ
1994), available at 1994 WL 497538 (holding that respondent-neighbors’ campaign of
harassment against Hispanic family in violation of § 3617 was not protected by the First
Amendment), petition for review dismissed without opinion, 110 F.3d 64, 1997 WL 103364 (6th
Cir. 1997); HUD v. Gutleben, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,078, at
25,727–28 (HUD ALJ 1994), available at 1994 WL 441981 (holding that respondentneighbors’ racial epithets and other remarks in violation of black tenants’ rights under § 3617
were not protected by the First Amendment), modified, Fair Housing–Fair Lending Rep. (Aspen
L. & Bus.) ¶ 25,103 (HUD ALJ 1994).
287 See Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1236
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (ruling against § 3617 claim after expressing “serious constitutional concerns”
about a case like this “where, arguably, Plaintiffs are trying to regulate speech because of its
emotive impact on the Plaintiffs”), vacated pursuant to settlement, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW,
2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003); Salisbury House, Inc. v. McDermott, No.
CIV.A. 96-CV-6468, 1998 WL 195693, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (ruling against § 3617
claim after expressing concern “about potential First Amendment conflicts which may arise
were we to interpret ‘interfere’ [in § 3617] in its broadest sense”); cf. Hous. Investors, Inc., 68 F.
Supp. 2d at 1301 (avoiding issue of whether the First Amendment protects § 3617 defendants
from liability based on their opposition to an affordable-housing project in public hearings
before local government commission by construing § 3617 not to cover such behavior). See
generally United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (noting that statutes
should be read to eliminate constitutional doubts “so long as such a reading is not plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress” (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483
(1988) (recognizing “the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid
constitutional difficulties” (citing Erznoznik v. Cty of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27
(1980) (“[T]his Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
288 See, e.g., Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d
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approach also reflects the FHA’s own first section, which states: “It is
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”289 All of
this makes clear that the basic theme of this Article—that § 3617
should be more generously interpreted to ban most forms of neighboron-neighbor harassment—must take into account First Amendment
concerns.
2. Cross-Burning Cases
The Supreme Court has made clear in two cross-burning cases that
racist expressions directed at minority homeowners may be regulated
consistent with the First Amendment. In the first, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota,290 a 1992 case, the Court struck down a city
ordinance banning certain hate-inspired symbols because it too
broadly restricted freedom of speech,291 but noted that the defendant’s
act of burning a cross in a black family’s yard could have been
prosecuted under a properly drawn statute.292 Indeed, the R.A.V.

644, 650–53 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting FHA-based challenge to newspaper’s housing ads that
featured only white models on the ground that the plaintiff’s theory hinged on a construction of
the FHA that raised serious First Amendment concerns); Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710
n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying in FHA case against landlord that basing liability on his biased
statement unrelated to a specific discriminatory transaction would raise difficult First
Amendment issues); see also United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164,
1169–71 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing liability finding because of the possibility that it may have
rested in part on the fact that the defendant had stated his belief that the FHA was
unconstitutional); cf. BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 529–36 (2002) (adopting a
limited construction of the National Labor Relations Act’s anti-interference provision in part to
avoid difficult First Amendment issues that might result from a broader interpretation).
289 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) (emphasis added).
290 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
291 Id. at 391–96.
292 See id. at 380 n.1 (listing a number of state criminal laws under which the defendant’s
conduct could have been punished). Indeed, the R.A.V. defendant himself was later convicted of
violating § 3631, the criminal provision that was passed as a companion to the FHA. See United
States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 824–28 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument of R.A.V. and his
coconspirators that their § 3631 convictions violated the First Amendment because § 3631 is
“not directed toward protected speech, but [is] directed only at intentional threats, intimidation,
and interference with federally guaranteed rights”). Other post-R.A.V. decisions also rejected
First Amendment challenges to § 3631 prosecutions for cross burning or similar behavior. See,
e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendants’
prosecution for cross burning was based on their “act and not the opinion or belief which
motivated it” and that their intentionally threatening and intimidating action was thus “not
protected by the First Amendment”); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that threats, which constitute conduct carried out through speech, are not
protected by the First Amendment); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1249–52 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that a cross burning is equivalent to fighting words, and therefore, prohibition is
constitutional); see also United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)
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opinion cited Title VII as an example of a constitutionally appropriate
restriction on conduct that may have the permissible secondary effect
of limiting expression.293 Eleven years later, in Virginia v. Black,294
the Court again found the particular statute at issue constitutionally
suspect, but held that “a State, consistent with the First Amendment,
may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”295
Thus, constitutional concerns do not prevent laws from banning
cross burning done with “the intent to intimidate.” This would
presumably also be true for other kinds of threatening speech
designed to intimidate a targeted person or group.296 As a result,
holding that § 3617 outlaws neighbor harassment that takes the form
of expression designed to intimidate a minority homeowner or tenant
would not violate the First Amendment.297

(rejecting habeas petition raising First Amendment challenge to § 3631 conviction for cross
burning at interracial couple’s home).
293 Thus, according to R.A.V.:
[S]exually derogatory “fighting words,” among other words, may produce a violation
of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment
practices. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they
express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.
505 U.S. at 389–90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991)); see also
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
Title VII’s prohibition of invidiously motivated employment discrimination).
294 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
295 Id. at 347; see also id. at 363 (“A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to
intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R.A.V. and is proscribable under the First
Amendment.”).
Two of the defendants in Black had been convicted under a Virginia criminal statute of
attempting to burn a cross on the yard of a black neighbor, id. at 351, and the Court, though
finding reversible error in their convictions, held that they could be retried for this act under a
narrowed interpretation of this statute that would avoid violating the First Amendment, id. at
367–68.
296 See id. at 362 (noting generally that “it would be constitutional to ban only a particular
type of threat” and quoting R.A.V. to the effect that “threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment” (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388)).
The text uses “presumably” only because the Court in Black was at pains to stress the
particularly noxious history of cross burning in the United States as a “symbol of hate.” See id.
at 353–57; see also id. at 389–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (recounting the history of cross
burning and concluding that “[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant
lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence”).
297 This statement assumes that § 3617 is directed primarily at conduct and only
secondarily affects speech, an assumption that is supported by its textual focus on acts that
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with” and by numerous decisions upholding the
constitutionality of convictions under its companion provision, § 3631. See, e.g., J.H.H., 22 F.3d
at 824–28 (quoted supra note 292); Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1250 (holding that § 3631 “is aimed at
curtailing wrongful conduct . . . . [and] because [it] is content-neutral, it does not directly
regulate speech”).
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But what of less egregious remarks, such as “Go back where you
belong”?298 At the very least, legitimate First Amendment concerns in
this type of situation reinforce the notion that § 3617 claims should be
subject to the Title VII standards adopted in Burlington, which means
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have to be
materially affected by the defendant’s comments. 299 As Burlington
instructed, this would require an examination of the particular
circumstances to determine whether such a person in this context
would have the enjoyment of his or her home materially harmed.300
Assuming a positive answer—and therefore potential § 3617
liability—then the First Amendment would allow such liability, at
least in those cases where the defendant’s comments were made with
the intent of intimidating the plaintiff. The difficult case would be
where a reasonable plaintiff felt materially harmed, but the defendant
did not intend to intimidate.
This is certainly possible, as a recent sex harassment case
illustrates. In Quigley v. Winter301 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
landlord’s liability under the FHA for subjecting a female tenant to

Concluding that such a statute is aimed at conduct is crucial to its passing constitutional
muster, as R.A.V. and its progeny make clear. See supra note 293 (quoting R.A.V.); Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (noting the importance of this distinction in upholding a
state statute providing for enhanced sentences for crimes motivated by race or other prohibited
factor by observing that “whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at
expression . . . , the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment”).
298 See, e.g., United States v. Collier, No. 08-0686, 2010 WL 3881381, at *10–11 (W.D.
La. Sept. 28, 2010) (holding that landlord violated § 3617 by, inter alia, repeatedly making
statements that he would not allow “those kind of people” to live at his residential community,
which statement the court found to reflect his intent “to prevent African Americans from buying
property or living at” this community); cf. Gomez–Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008)
(citing comments made to the plaintiff that she should “go back to where she belong[ed]” as one
example of the harassment that justified her retaliation claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
May, 359 F.3d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting defendant convicted for violating § 3631 who
said that his burning of a cross near a black family’s home was to “let the nigger know he
wasn’t welcomed [sic] here” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McInnis, 976
F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under § 3631, the defendant’s sign stating
“Niggers Get Out! Go Back To Your Slums” supported jury’s finding that the defendant
“intended to interfere with [the neighboring black family’s] occupancy of their home” (citing
United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Foster, No. 04-CI-03103, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 1, 2008) (holding that state’s equivalent of § 3631 was violated by, inter alia, the
defendants’ “yelling racial epithets such as ‘f----- niggers’ and ‘get out of town’”).
299 See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington).
300 See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington).
301 598 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2010).
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“unwanted interactions of a sexual nature” in her home,302 noting that
this was “a place where Quigley was entitled to feel safe and secure
and need not flee, which makes Winter’s conduct even more
egregious.”303 Obviously, the Eighth Circuit believed that the plaintiff
felt materially harmed by the defendant’s conduct,304 but,
significantly for our discussion here, it never described that conduct
as being undertaken with an intent to intimidate.305
3. Speech Directed at People in Their Homes
In Quigley, the defendant’s offensive behavior included instances
of purely verbal communication, but he raised no First Amendment
defense.306 This seems appropriate, in light of the fact that only
limited constitutional protection exists for speech that is directed at
people in their homes. The Supreme Court has recognized that there
is a “significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker’s
right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners
from unwanted communication,”307 and the Court has applied this
“unwilling audience” doctrine with particular diligence in cases
involving communicative intrusions into a listener’s home.308 The
302 Id.

at 947.
Elsewhere in Quigley, the Eighth Circuit commented that the defendant’s conduct
was especially reprehensible because it “intruded upon Quigley’s sense of security in her own
home.” Id. at 954.
304 As a result of the defendant’s unwelcome sexual advances, the plaintiff considered
moving and felt “uncomfortable,” “scared,” and “worried about protecting her children and
younger sister,” id. at 944, for which the jury awarded her $13,685 in compensatory damages on
her FHA claims, id. at 945. This award was not challenged on appeal, but the Eighth Circuit did
reduce the jury’s punitive award of $250,000 to $54,750. Id. at 952–56.
305 See id. at 944–48. The Eighth Circuit described the defendant’s conduct as
“reprehensible” and “unquestionably intentional and more than churlish,” id. at 954, but it never
focused on or determined whether this conduct was intended to intimidate the plaintiff.
Similar holdings occur regularly in the employment context. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield
Heathcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding in a Title VII case “that a reasonable
person would find [the defendant’s] work environment hostile or abusive” based in part on
coworkers’ racial epithets directed at the black plaintiff, without considering whether these
remarks were intended to intimidate her).
306 See Quigley, 598 F.3d at 944–48. The purely verbal examples of the defendant’s
unwelcome interactions with the plaintiff included “sexually suggestive comments” and
“several middle of the night phone calls to her home.” Id. at 947. There was also evidence of
unwelcome physical interactions, e.g., “unwanted touching on two occasions.” Id.
307 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–16 (2000).
308 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (recognizing
government’s overriding “interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home” and the home’s special role as a place to “avoid intrusions” and one “which the State
may legislate to protect” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971) (“[T]his Court has recognized that government may properly act in many
situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas
303 Id.
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rationale is that, while people assume the risk of being confronted
with unwanted speech when they venture out into the world, their
home is the one place to which they are entitled to retreat to enjoy
privacy, repose, and peace of mind;309 as a result, the government’s
interest in protecting people from unwelcome speech in their homes is
“of the highest order.”310
A leading case involving this doctrine is Frisby v. Schultz,311
where the Court in 1988—the same year that the FHAA reenacted
§ 3617’s substantive prohibitions312—rejected a First Amendment
challenge to an ordinance that banned picketing targeted at an
individual residence.313 Speaking for the Court in Frisby, Justice
O’Connor wrote:

which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue . . . . [In terms of one’s] claim to a
recognizable privacy interest . . . , surely there is nothing like the interest in being free from
unwanted expression in the confines of one’s own home.”); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“The ancient concept that a ‘man’s home is his castle’ into which
‘not even the king may enter’ has lost none of it vitality, and none of the recognized exceptions
includes any right to communicate offensively with another.” (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967))); infra notes 310 and 314 and accompanying texts (discussing Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)); see also Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002) (noting that “the
protection of residents’ privacy” is among the “important interests that the [government] may
seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity”); Consol. Edison Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 & n.11 (1980) (recognizing “the special
privacy interests that attach to persons who seek seclusion within their own homes” (citing
Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737)); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)
(“[S]elective [speech] restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home . . . .” (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. 728)).
309 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484–85; supra note 308; infra notes 310 and 314 and
accompanying text (discussing Frisby and Carey).
310 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471). According to the Carey
opinion:
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women
can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an
important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an
individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes the last citadel of
the tired, the weary, and the sick.” The State’s interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society.
447 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125
(1969) (Black, J., concurring).
311 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
312 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
313 The stated purpose of the ordinance in Frisby was “‘the protection and preservation of
the home’ through assurance ‘that members of the community enjoy in their homes and
dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy.’” 487 U.S. at 477. The Supreme
Court recently cited Frisby with approval as having “upheld a ban on such [targeted] picketing
‘before or about’ a particular residence, [Frisby,] 487 U.S., at 477.” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct.
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[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within
their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an
ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that
individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into
their own homes and that the government may protect this
freedom.
. . . There simply is no right to force speech into the home
of an unwilling listener.314
Moreover, Frisby made clear that where the intruding speech is
directed solely at an individual rather than to the general public, even
“core” First Amendment speech like picketing is less worthy of
protection, and the government’s ability to restrict it is
correspondingly greater.315
Frisby’s recognition that some types of hostile, targeted speech
may be barred from intruding into the homes of unwilling listeners
provides a strong basis for allowing § 3617 to ban housing
harassment without fear of constitutional problems.316 Housing
harassment is particularly damaging precisely because it affects its
targets’ sense of security in their home,317 a place where, according to
Frisby, people have a right to be protected from unwanted
intrusions.318 Surely, race-based and other invidiously motivated
neighbor-on-neighbor harassment would be expected to have at least
as dire consequences for its targets as those that moved the Court in
Frisby to uphold governmental protection for the targets of residential
picketing.319 Furthermore, because Frisby and other “unwilling

1207, 1218 (2011).
314 Frisby, 487 U.S. 484–85 (citations omitted). The Court commented on the nature of
targeted residential picketing in Frisby. See id. at 486 (noting that this type of speech has a
“devastating effect . . . on the quiet enjoyment of the home . . . . ‘To those inside . . . the home
becomes something less than a home when and while the picketing . . . continue[s]. . . . [The]
tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that reason, less
inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.’” (alterations and third, fourth, and
fifth omissions in original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
315 See id. at 479, 486 (noting that, while the antipicketing ordinance “operates at the core
of the First Amendment,” the picketers whose speech was restricted “do not seek to disseminate
a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident . . . in an especially
offensive way”).
316 For a detailed description of how this “unwilling listener” doctrine applies to FHA
cases involving sex-based harassing statements challenged under the FHA’s § 3604(c), see
Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 280, at 844–53.
317 See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text.
318 See supra note 314 and accompanying text; see also supra note 310.
319 See supra note 314.

1/14/2011 1:31:54 AM

64

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3

listener” cases have upheld restrictions on even core First
Amendment speech where the speaker “has legitimate and important
[constitutional] concerns,”320 and have done so by concluding that the
challenged law “reflects an acceptable balance between the
constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers and the
interests of unwilling listeners,”321 they would provide an even
stronger basis for supporting § 3617’s ban of such low-value speech
as housing-related harassing statements.322
F. Summary
The interpretive sources examined in Part III have established that
the proper standard for neighbor harassment cases under § 3617 is
different from the Halprin-Bloch requirement of a “pattern of
harassment.”323 Indeed, single-incident behavior, as illustrated by the
cross burnings in Black and R.A.V., would often violate § 3617. Some
of these single incidents, of course, are egregious enough to satisfy
the first part of the “severe or pervasive” standard that governs
harassment cases under § 3604(b) and Title VII.324 The problem with
using this standard in neighbor harassment cases, however, is that it
does not reflect the language of § 3617.
That language makes it unlawful to “interfere with” anyone “in the
exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by”
§§ 3603–3606.325 If the phrase “interferes with” is given its common
meaning—as set forth in dictionaries at the time of § 3617’s
enactment—then, as the Ninth Circuit held in Walker, this requires no
more than the act of “meddling in or hampering” an FHA-protected
right.326 And, according to HUD’s regulation interpreting § 3617,
rights “granted or protected by” §§ 3603–3606 include the peaceful
enjoyment of one’s home free from such invidiously motivated
meddling.327
320 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479, 486
(described supra note 315).
321 Hill, 530 U.S. at 714.
322 To the extent that any First Amendment protection might exist for harassing speech
otherwise outlawed by § 3617, the exact parameters of this protection should be left for the
courts to develop over time based on the particular facts of individual situations and the
doctrines discussed here. As Frisby noted after rejecting a facial challenge to the ordinance there
based on the First Amendment, “the constitutionality of applying the ordinance to [specific]
hypotheticals remains open to question.” 487 U.S. at 488.
323 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (quoting Bloch, which quotes Halprin).
324 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (citing cases).
325 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
326 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (quoting Walker).
327 See supra text accompanying note 156 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010)).
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Assuming that Burlington’s Title VII standards are adopted in
§ 3617-based neighbor harassment cases, this would simply require
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position be materially
affected by the defendant’s behavior.328 This standard might well
include racist or other invidiously motivated abusive comments by a
hostile neighbor, even if such comments did not involve a “pattern of
harassment.” Certainly, such an interpretation of § 3617 would be
supported by that part of the 1968 FHA’s legislative history showing
Congress’s desire that this law foster integrated living patterns, as
well as by the 1988 FHAA’s effort to provide more vigorous
enforcement in response to Congress’s perception that the original
statute had failed to achieve its promise. Finally, the First
Amendment would certainly permit § 3617 to be interpreted to
prevent neighbor harassment undertaken with an intent to intimidate
and, based on Frisby and similar home-protection decisions, even
harassment that lacks this intent but is targeted at minority
homeowners or tenants and simply reflects an intent to disrupt the
peaceful enjoyment of their homes.329 Furthermore, such an improper
intent may be gleaned from a § 3617 defendant’s remarks without
incurring any First Amendment problems.330
IV. CONCLUSION
More than four decades after enactment of the Fair Housing Act,
thousands of minority families every year are still subjected to
harassment motivated by race or other FHA-condemned factor. Apart
from the devastating personal cost to the targets of such harassment,
this phenomenon frustrates the FHA’s basic goal of breaking down
residential segregation and encouraging integrated living patterns in
the United States. Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, which reenacted the FHA’s key antiharassment provision
328 See

supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington).
supra Part III.E.3 (discussing First Amendment implications of speech directed at
people in their homes).
330 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000). The Hill Court noted:
329 See

It is common in the law to examine the content of a communication to determine
the speaker’s purpose. Whether a particular statement constitutes a threat, blackmail,
an agreement to fix prices, a copyright violation, a public offering of securities, or an
offer to sell goods often depends on the precise content of the statement. We have
never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or
written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of
conduct.
Id.
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(§ 3617) and beefed up the FHA’s enforcement procedures, has yet to
turn this situation around.
One problem is that the courts have never been clear about the
basic thrust of § 3617 or its relationship to the FHA’s other
substantive provisions in §§ 3603–3606, to which § 3617 refers. This
problem was greatly exacerbated by Judge Posner’s 2004 opinion in
the Halprin case, which suggested that neither § 3617 nor any other
FHA provision should be interpreted to outlaw discrimination
directed at current residents. Before the Seventh Circuit corrected this
mistake in its 2009 en banc decision in Bloch, the Fifth Circuit and a
number of district courts around the country decided to follow
Halprin, leaving the law relating to § 3617’s coverage of neighbor
harassment badly confused.
Whether the courts that followed Halprin will now abandon that
position in favor of Bloch’s new approach remains to be seen. But
even if they do, one of Bloch’s key directives about neighbor-onneighbor harassment cases is troubling, because it chose to adopt
Halprin’s view that only a “pattern of harassment” could violate
§ 3617. This view is not supported by § 3617’s text, purpose, or
legislative history, but it may resonate with those courts that fear a
broader interpretation of § 3617 would turn the FHA into a “civility
code” by providing a federal forum for simple “quarrels among
neighbors.”
This Article is designed to counteract that fear and to provide a
solid basis for correctly interpreting § 3617 in neighbor harassment
cases. By its terms, § 3617 makes it unlawful to “interfere with”
anyone “in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or
protected by” §§ 3603–3606.331 A proper interpretation of the quoted
phrases—based on their words’ common meanings as set forth in
popular dictionaries from the time of the FHA’s enactment and on
HUD’s current authoritative regulation—would mean that a § 3617
violation requires no more than that a neighbor’s invidiously
motivated harassment hamper the target family’s peaceful enjoyment
of their home.332 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s
analogous provision suggests that neighbor harassment cases under
§ 3617 should also require that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position be materially affected by the defendant’s behavior.333

331 42

U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
supra text accompanying notes 326–27.
333 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text (discussing Burlington).
332 See
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This standard should govern § 3617 cases, which means that it
could well be violated by a single incident, as well as a pattern of
harassment. Such an interpretation is also supported by the FHA’s
purpose and legislative history and would not run afoul of First
Amendment protection for the defendant-neighbor’s speech.
A few courts have adopted this view of § 3617 in neighbor-onneighbor harassment cases. This Article is intended to provide courts
in future cases with the resources to accept this position and resist the
unduly narrow perception of § 3617 suggested by Halprin, Bloch, and
their progeny. Without a proper judicial understanding of § 3617’s
role in neighbor harassment cases, the problems posed by such cases
will not be solved and the FHA’s ultimate goal of replacing racebased residential enclaves with truly integrated living patterns cannot
be achieved.

